3. Neo-Classical Comparative Advantage
3. Neo-Classical Comparative Advantage
The role of labour standards in fostering international trade has been in the forefront of the trade policy agenda in recent years. It has attracted the interest of humanitarian organisations, governments, and international organisations as production of labour-intensive goods has continued to move to developing countries with increased globalisation.
In a 2002 article, Matthias Busse analysed econometrically whether different categories of labour standards do, in fact, have an effect on comparative advantage in developing countries.
He addressed the question of whether a developing country can derive comparative advantage in unskilled-labour-intensive goods by employing low labour standards and thus increase its world exports.
A number of different groups believe that this is happening and thus are urging the implementation of import barriers against countries with notably lower standards for both humanitarian reasons and to ensure a more “level playing field”.
Busse distinguished between “core” labour standards (important human rights such as union rights, freedom from forced labour, abolition of child labour, equal opportunity) and labour standards often referred to as “acceptable conditions of work” (e.g., minimum wages, safety and health standards).
He focused on the effect of core standards on comparative advantage and exports utilising the Heckscher-Ohlin theoretical framework developed in this chapter to provide the underpinnings for his empirical work.
Because comparative advantage is determined by relative factor endowments, he hypothesised that lower core labour standards would lead to a relative increase in unskilled labor and thus increase relative exports of unskilled-labor-intensive goods.
Five indicators of core labor standards:
discrimination against women
presence of child labour
use of forced labour
basic union rights
number of ratifications of the eight International Labour Office (ILO) conventions of core labour standards
These were key variables used to explain the share of unskilled-labour-intensive goods in total exports in an 83-country cross-section regression analysis.
Several of the more interesting conclusions were that:
Greater discrimination against women weakened comparative advantage.
Whereas weaker union rights, greater child labour, and greater use of forced labour increased export share.
Interestingly, the number of ratifications of the ILO conventions appeared to have no significant effect.
It is, however, important to note that in all cases educational attainment and the overall relative labour endowment had relatively stronger influences on the trade patterns than did the labour standard variables.
Interesting and useful policy analysis, such as that contained in the Busse paper, necessitates the use of a more formal structure in which the complexities of international comparative advantage can be sorted out in a consistent way.
In previous chapters, we demonstrated that a country will gain from trade anytime that the terms of trade differ from its own relative prices in autarky. The country gains by expanding production of and exporting the commodity that is relatively more valuable in the foreign market and reducing production of and importing the good that is relatively less expensive in the foreign market. These adjustments permit the consumption of a combination of goods that lies outside the production-possibilities frontier at a higher level of consumer well-being.
It was further demonstrated that the underlying basis for the relative price differences that led to international trade could be traced to differences in supply and/or demand conditions in the two countries. This analysis assumes that there is no intervention in the markets to alter prices from these general equilibrium results. Clearly, taxes and subsidies can cause autarky prices to be more or less different prior to trade.
This chapter will examine in greater detail the factors that influence relative prices prior to international trade, focusing on differences in supply conditions.
We first examine how different relative quantities of the factors of production can influence product prices and produce a basis for trade.
We then discuss how the resulting trade will in turn affect factor prices and the distribution of income within the trading countries.
Finally, the implications of various assumptions employed in the analysis are presented. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a deeper understanding of the critical factors underlying relative cost differences and therefore comparative advantage.
The effects of factor endowments on international trade were analysed early in the twentieth century by two Swedish economists, Eli Heckscher (in 1919) and Bertil Ohlin (in 1933).
As employed by modern economists, this analysis makes a number of simplifying assumptions, specifically that:
There are two countries, two homogeneous goods, and two homogeneous factors of production whose initial levels are fixed and assumed to be relatively different for each country.
Technology is identical in both countries; that is, production functions are the same in both countries.
Production is characterised by constant returns to scale for both commodities in both countries.
The two commodities have different relative factor intensities, and the respective commodity factor intensities are the same for all factor price ratios.
Tastes and preferences are the same in both countries. Further, for any given set of product prices, the two products are consumed in the same relative quantities at all levels of income; that is, there are homothetic tastes and preferences.
Perfect competition exists in both countries.
Factors are perfectly mobile within each country and not mobile between countries.
There are no transportation costs.
There are no policies restricting the movement of goods between countries or interfering with the market determination of prices and output.
Most of these assumptions are common to the models examined in previous chapters. However, the two that are especially critical to the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) explanation of the emergence and structure of trade are (assumption 1) that factor endowments are different in each country and (assumption 4) that commodities are always intensive in a given factor regardless of relative factor prices. These two assumptions need to be examined in greater detail prior to discussing the H-O theorem.
It is important to understand that the phrase different factor endowments refers to different relative factor endowments, not different absolute amounts.
Crucial to the H-O analysis is that factor proportions are different between the two countries.
Relative factor abundance may be defined in two ways: the physical definition and the price definition:
The physical definition explains factor abundance in terms of the physical units of two factors, for example, labour and capital, available in each of the two countries.
Country I would be the capital-abundant country if its ratio of capital to labour exceeded the ratio of capital to labour in country II:
It must be stressed that the relative amount of the factors is critical, not country size.
A country with fewer absolute units of physical capital than a larger country could still be the capital-abundant country as long as the amount of capital relative to labor was greater than the same ratio in the larger country.
Finally, in the two-country, two-factor case, if country I is the capital-abundant country, then country II must by definition be the labor-abundant country.
2. The price definition relies on the relative prices of capital and labor to reveal the type of factor abundance characterising the two countries.
According to this definition, country I would be the capital-abundant country as long as:
That is, the ratio of the price or rental rate of capital (r) to the price or wage of labor (w) in country I is less than in country II. This definition views relative abundance in terms of the factors’ relative scarcity prices.
The greater the relative abundance of a factor, the lower its relative price.
One definition focuses on physical availability (supply), and the other focuses on factor price.
What is the link, if any, between the two? On the surface, there does not seem to be a problem because the greater or smaller the supply of a factor, the lower or higher its price tends to be.
In countries with large populations such as India and China, the price of labour is relatively low while that of capital is relatively high.
The converse tends to be true in a country such as Germany or the United States.
However, the problem is that the factor price reflects not only the supply of available factors but also the demand.
Because factors of production are not consumed directly but are used to produce final goods and services that are consumed, demand for the factors results from the structure of demand for final goods and services.
Demand for a factor of production is thus often referred to as a derived demand resulting from producers meeting final consumption preferences.
Factor prices reflect not only the physical availability of the factors in question but also the structure of final demand and the production technology employed.
Fortunately, because the H-O model assumes that technology and tastes and preferences are the same in both countries, the two definitions will produce the same result.
With technology and demand influences neutralised between the two countries, the country with the relatively larger K/L ratio also will have the relatively smaller r/w ratio. The link between the two definitions is unambiguous unless technology or demands differ between the two countries. When this happens, the price definition may differ from the physical definition; for example, physically abundant capital may be relatively high priced. We refer to this possibility later in the chapter.
A commodity is said to be factor-x-intensive whenever the ratio of factor x to a second factor y is larger when compared with a similar ratio of factor usage of a second commodity.
For example, steel is said to be capital intensive compared with cloth if the K/L ratio in steel production is larger than the K/L ratio in cloth production.
H-O assumes not only that the two commodities have different factor intensities at common factor prices but also that the difference holds for all possible factor price ratios in both countries. This means that at all possible factor prices, the isoquants reflecting the technology used in steel production are more oriented toward the capital axis, compared with the isoquants reflecting cloth production, so that the capital/labor ratio for steel will always be larger than that for cloth (see Figure 1).
It is important to note that this assumption does not preclude substituting labor for capital if capital becomes relatively more expensive, or substituting capital for labor if the relative price of labor rises. While such price changes would indeed change the capital/labor ratios in both commodities, they would never cause cloth to use more capital relative to labor compared with steel. This is a strong assumption and it is critical to the H-O analysis. We will later examine some possible conditions when it would not hold and the resulting implications for international trade.
Relative factor endowments differ considerably across countries.
Table 1 gives three factor ratios for a number of selected countries to provide some indication of the degree of difference in endowments in 1992.
Table 2 then provides more recent estimates for a smaller number of countries for 2010. The wide variety of relative factor endowments supports the idea that underlying factor supply conditions continue to vary from country to country, as Heckscher and Ohlin posited many years ago.
The set of assumptions about production leads to the conclusion that the production-possibilities frontier (PPF) will differ between two countries solely as a result of their differing factor endowments.
With identical technology in both countries, constant returns to scale, and a given factor-intensity relationship between final products, the country with abundant capital will be able to produce relatively more of the capital-intensive good, while the country with abundant labor will be able to produce relatively more of the labor-intensive good.
The shape and position of the PPF is thus determined by the factor intensities of the two goods and the amount of each factor available. This is obvious if one compares the Edgeworth boxes for two countries with different factor endowments (see Figure 2).
The two boxes show that country I is the capital-abundant country. This is evident since the height of the box (amount of capital) is greater for country I, whereas the length of the box (physical amount of labor) is greater for country II.
In more general terms, the slope of the diagonal reflects the K/L ratio and therefore the relative endowment of the country.
This slope is greater in country I, making it clearly the capital-abundant country.
The analysis in Chapter 5, which discussed how the PPF was obtained from the Edgeworth box, leads us to conclude that the PPF for each country will be different.
Country I’s PPF is oriented more toward steel, and country II’s PPF is oriented more toward cloth. If these two differently shaped PPFs are now combined with the same set of tastes and preferences, two different sets of relative prices will emerge in autarky, as shown in Figure 3(a).
The relative price of steel will be lower in country I (the capital-abundant country) as reflected in a steeper autarky price line, while the relative price of cloth will be lower in country II (the labor-abundant country) as evidenced by a flatter autarky price line.
Because relative prices in autarky are different between the two countries, a clear basis for trade results from the different factor endowments.
The trade implications of this situation can be seen in Figure 3(b). The international terms of trade must lie necessarily between the two internal price ratios, being flatter than the autarky price line in country I and steeper than the autarky price line in country II.
In this situation, country I will export steel to and import cloth from country II, reaching a higher community indifference curve in the process.
Country II also will find itself better off by exporting cloth and importing steel.
The common equilibrium international terms of trade that produce this result are drawn between the autarky prices of both of the countries.
A single international terms-of-trade (TOT) line, (PC/PS)int, tangent to both PPFs, is used in panel (b) for convenience, although all that is required is an equally sloped TOT line, not necessarily a common line.
For equilibrium to occur, country I’s desired exports of steel (S1S0) and imports of cloth (C2C1) must equal exactly country II’s desired exports of cloth (C1C0) and imports of steel (S2S1) at the prevailing international terms of trade.
When this occurs, both countries find themselves on the higher indifference curve, IC1, indicating the mutual gain from trade.
Heckscher-Ohlin importantly assumed that relative factor intensities were different across commodities.
To provide an indication of the degree of variation within a given country, we calculated in Table 3 the capital/labor ratios for a selected group of industries, mostly in manufacturing, in Canada in 2006. (The data for constructing this table are not available for years after 2006 as the relevant series were discontinued.)
As can be observed, there are huge differences in the ratios, going from a high of $2,675,267 per worker to about $9,000 per worker.
Then, in Table 4, we present Canadian capital/labor ratios for a range of more broadly defined industries in 2014. The figures are the ratio of net capital stock at the end of 2013 (beginning of 2014) to the number of workers employed in 2014. Again, there is a very large degree of variation across industries.
The previous discussion used the physical definition of factor abundance. A similar result would have occurred if we had used the price definition.
Because country I is the capital-abundant country,
With identical technology and constant returns to scale, country I will be able to produce steel relatively more cheaply than country II, and country II can produce cloth relatively more cheaply than country I.
This relationship between relative factor prices and relative product prices can be developed more formally through isoquant-isocost analysis.
Consider Figure 4(a).
Given isocost line MN in country I, whose slope reflects (w/r)I, steel would be produced at point X and cloth at point Y. Thus, the same factor cost in the two industries yields S1 units of steel and C1 units of cloth.
Isoquants represent all the same output on their slope
On the other hand, (w/r)II < (w/r)I, so a flatter isocost line is present in country II (M′N′). Given this isocost line, country II’s producers would select points Q and T. Hence, in country II, C2 units have the same cost as S1, while in country I only C1 units (a smaller quantity than C2) could be produced for the same cost as S1. Thus, cloth is relatively cheaper in country II and steel is relatively cheaper in country I
The conclusion is that a higher w/r leads to a higher relative price of cloth. As cloth is a more labour-intensive industry
The H-O relationship is illustrated in Figure 4(b).
Note that if steel had been the relatively labor-intensive good rather than cloth, the relationship would be reflected in a downward-sloping line. It is now clear that different relative factor prices will generate different relative commodity prices in autarky. Consequently, there is a basis for trade, and each country will export the product it can produce less expensively: steel in country I and cloth in country II.
This same conclusion was reached in the graphical PPF analysis that utilized the physical definition of factor abundance. In both cases, each country expanded production of and exported the good that made the more intensive use of its relatively abundant factor of production.
Paul A. Samuelson was one of the most widely known economists in the United States, due not only to his prodigious research for the last half-century but also for the success of his principles book, Economics, which introduced millions of students to the subject and which has been in print for well over 60 years.
He was born in Gary, Indiana, in 1915 and later attended some 14 different secondary schools, eventually entering the University of Chicago at age 16. Upon graduation in 1935, he studied economics at Harvard University for five years. Samuelson published his first article in 1937 as a 21-year old graduate student and averaged more than five articles a year during his career.
His 1941 doctoral dissertation is still regarded as the groundbreaking work on the mathematical foundations of theoretical economics. He accepted a position on the economics faculty at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1940 and remained there until his death in 2009. His contributions were in the areas of:
microeconomic theory
consumer theory
welfare economics
capital theory
dynamics
general equilibrium
public finance
macroeconomics
international trade
He received the National Medal of Science in 1996 from President Bill Clinton, and he advised Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Samuelson once said, “Our subject puts its best foot forward when it speaks out on international trade,” and his own contributions in the area have had a lasting impact. In the study of trade, he is well known for his seminal work on Heckscher-Ohlin (sometimes referred to as the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model), focusing on factor price equalisation and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem on the distributional effects of trade (discussed later in this chapter). He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1970 and has received all the major honours in the economics profession. His many mathematical and theoretical contributions have had a profound effect on the discipline and the profession. His MIT colleague Robert Solow (also a Nobel laureate) noted that Samuelson “was producing new ideas into his 94th and last year.”
Sources: Stanley Fischer, “Paul Anthony Samuelson,” in John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 4 (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 234–41; Adrian Kendry, “Paul Samuelson and the Scientific Awakening of Economics,” in J. R. Shackleton and Gareth Locksley, eds., Twelve Contemporary Economists (London: Macmillan, 1981), chap. 12; “Paul A. Samuelson, Nobel Laureate,” MIT Department of Economics website, econ-www.mit.edu; Robert M. Solow, “Paul A. Samuelson, (1915–2009),” Science, vol. 327, January 15, 2010, p. 282.
With this H-O analysis in mind, one of its major conclusions, commonly referred to as the,
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem: a country will export the commodity that uses relatively intensively its relatively abundant factor of production, and it will import the good that uses relatively intensively its relatively scarce factor of production.
This conclusion follows logically from the initial assumptions. While the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem seems to be consistent in a general way with what we observe, violations of H-O assumptions can lead to different behaviour by a nation in terms of the commodity structure of its trade. The extent to which the H-O theorem is supported by empirical tests is discussed in the next chapter.
Different relative prices in autarky are sufficient to generate a basis for trade in trade theory.
Further, as trade takes place between two countries, prices adjust until both countries face the same set of relative prices. Our discussion of H-O demonstrated that this convergence of product prices takes place as the price of the product using the relatively abundant factor increases with trade and the price of the product using the country’s relatively scarce factor falls.
This change in final product prices has implications for the prices of factors in both of the participating countries as well, as was rigorously pointed out by Paul A. Samuelson in 1949. Let’s again consider the two countries producing cloth and steel, with cloth the labor-intensive good and steel the capital-intensive good. Country I is the capital-abundant country and country II the labor-abundant country. With the opening of trade, the price of cloth rises and the price of steel falls in country II, signaling producers to produce more cloth and less steel. Assuming perfect competition, production will shift along the PPF toward more output of cloth and less of steel. For this to happen, resources must be shifted from the production of steel to cloth. However, the bundle of resources released from steel production is different from the bundle required for increased cloth production because the relative factor intensities of the two goods differ. As the capital-intensive good, steel uses a bundle of resources that contains relatively more capital than the bundle of resources desired by cloth producers at the initial factor prices. Alternatively, the bundle released from steel production does not contain the required amount of labor relative to capital to satisfy the expanding cloth production. There is thus an increase in the demand for labor and a decrease in the demand for capital as this adjustment takes place. Assuming fixed factor supplies (see Figure 5), these market changes will lead to an increase in the price of labor and a decrease in the price of capital. The change of factor prices will cause the factor price ratio, (w/r)II, to rise and induce producers to move to a different equilibrium point on each respective isoquant (see Figure 6). Note that these price and production adjustments lead to a higher K/L ratio in both industries in this labor-abundant country. In country I, a similar adjustment takes place. With the initiation of trade, the relative price of steel rises, signaling producers to produce more steel and less cloth. The expansion of steel production and the contraction of cloth production lead to an increase in the overall demand for capital and a decrease in the overall demand for labor. With factor supplies fixed, an increase in the price of capital and a decrease in the price of labor will occur. The resulting decline in the factor price ratio, (w/r)I, means that producers will substitute labor for capital in both industries until the ratio of factor prices is again equal to the slope of the production isoquants. As a result of this change in relative prices, the K/L ratio in country I will fall in both industries.
Combining the general equilibrium results of country I and country II reveals an interesting phenomenon. Prior to trade, (w/r)I < (w/r)II. However, with trade the factor price ratio in country I falls while that of country II rises. Trade will expand until both countries face the same set of relative factor prices. The result is what is known as the factor price equalization theorem, often referred to as the second important contribution of the H-O analysis (the first being the H-O theorem): in equilibrium, with both countries facing the same relative (and absolute) product prices, with both having the same technology, and with constant returns to scale, relative (and absolute) costs will be equalized; the only way this can happen is if, in fact, factor prices are equalized. Trade in final goods essentially substitutes for movement of factors between countries, leading to an increase in the price of the abundant factor and a fall in the price of the scarce factor among participating countries until relative factor prices are equal (see Figure 7). Although the implications of trade for factor prices seem logically correct, we do not observe in practice the complete factor price equalization suggested by H-O. This is not surprising because several of the assumptions of H-O are not realized, or not realized as fully as stated in the model. Transportation costs, tariffs, subsidies, or other economic policies contribute to different product prices between countries. If product prices are not the same, then relative factor prices certainly cannot be expected to be the same although the tendency to equalize can still be present. In addition to the failure of goods prices to equalize, imperfect competition, nontraded goods, and unemployed resources also cause problems for factor price equalization. In addition, the factors of production are not homogeneous. If one acknowledges that the relative structure and quality of factors can vary between countries, the equalization of factor prices—in the sense that they are discussed here—is much less likely to come about. Further, technology is not everywhere identical, so that the rewards given the factors of production may well vary from country to country and inhibit the equalization of factor prices.
Despite these limitations, the H-O model provides some helpful insights into the likely impact of trade on relative factor prices. Trade based on comparative advantage should tend to increase the demand for the abundant factor and ultimately exert some upward pressure on its price, assuming that the presence of unemployed resources does not entirely absorb the price pressure. Thus, for the labor-abundant country, trade can offer a way to employ more fully the abundant factor and/or to increase its wages, and at the same time earn scarce foreign exchange necessary to import needed capital goods. The experiences of economies such as Taiwan support this view and demonstrate that in a general way, the factor price movements described earlier do occur. Finally, as economist Robert Mundell (1957) noted, the same result would obtain with respect to commodity prices and factor prices if factors were mobile between countries and final products were immobile internationally. In this instance, the relatively abundant factors would move from relatively low-price countries to high-price countries, causing factor price movements similar to those described. These factor movements would continue until factor (and commodity) prices are equalized, assuming that such movement of factors is costless. Thus, concerning their impact on prices, goods movements and factor movements are indeed substitutes for each other.
Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson developed the Stolper-Samuelson theorem in an article published in 1941. The initial article focused on the income distribution effects of tariffs, but the theorem was subsequently employed in the literature to explain the income distribution effects of international trade in general. The argument builds upon the changes in factor prices that accompany the opening of trade, which were discussed in the previous section. The argument proceeds as follows: assume that a labor-abundant country initiates trade. This will lead to an increase in the price of the abundant factor, labor, and a decrease in the price of the scarce factor, capital. Assuming that full employment takes place both page 136before and after trade, it is clear that labor’s total nominal income has increased, because the wage has increased and the labor employed remains the same. Similarly, the nominal income share of capital will have fallen since the price of capital has fallen and the capital employed remains the same at full employment. To this point the argument seems very straightforward. However, it is important to remember that the ability to obtain goods and services, that is, real income, depends not only on changes in income but also on changes in product prices. Thus, workers who consume only the cheaper, imported capital-intensive good are clearly better off, because their nominal income has increased and the price of the capital-intensive good has fallen. Their absolute and relative command over this product has increased. But what about those workers who consume only the labor-intensive export good? This case is not so clear, since both their nominal income and the price of the good they consume have increased. If their income has increased relatively more (less) than the price of the labor-intensive good, then their real income has increased (decreased). Is it possible to reach a definitive conclusion about the real income of this group with trade? Using the equilibrium condition that comes about in competitive factor markets, we can demonstrate that the wage rate in the labor-abundant country will rise relatively more than the price of the export good. Remember that, in equilibrium, labor’s wage equals the marginal physical product of labor (MPPL) times the price of the export good. Because both the wage and the price of the export good are increasing, the answer to the question, “Which is rising relatively more?,” rests on the nature of changes in MPPL. If labor is becoming more productive, then wages will be rising more than the price of the export good, and real income will be rising. If labor is becoming less productive, then wage increases will be outpaced by rising export-good prices. With trade, the labor-abundant country will find the price of capital falling and the wage rate increasing (as noted earlier), and its producers will respond by using relatively more capital and relatively less labor in production; that is, the capital/labor ratio in production will rise. This will increase the productivity of labor at the margin (i.e., MPPL increases), resulting in an unambiguous increase in the real income of labor. We can therefore conclude that the real income share of the owners of the abundant factor increases with trade. Because a similar argument can be used to demonstrate that the price of capital is falling relatively more than the price of the capital-intensive import (because with an increase in the capital/labor ratio the marginal product of capital is falling, as each unit of capital has less labor to work with), it is clear that the real income of the owners of the scarce factor is decreasing with trade. This result—that the price of a factor changes relatively more than the price of the good intensive in that factor—is often referred to as the magnification effect. Thus, the third aspect of the Heckscher-Ohlin analysis regarding the income distribution effects of trade is explained in the following more formal way by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem: with full employment both before and after trade takes place, the increase in the price of the abundant factor and the fall in the price of the scarce factor because of trade imply that the owners of the abundant factor will find their real incomes rising and the owners of the scarce factor will find their real incomes falling. Given these conclusions, it is not surprising that owners of the relatively abundant resources tend to be “free traders” while owners of relatively scarce resources tend to favor trade restrictions. For example, within the United States, agricultural producers and owners of technology and capital-intensive industries have tended to support expanding trade and/or dismantling trade restrictions, while organized labor has tended to oppose the expansion of trade. Finally, we may not see the clear-cut income distribution effects with trade because relative factor prices in the real world do not often appear to be as responsive to trade as the H-O model implies. In addition, personal or household income distribution reflects page 137not only the distribution of income between factors of production but also the ownership of the factors of production. Because individuals or households often own several factors of production, the final impact of trade on personal income distribution is far from clear. Conclusions The initial work by Heckscher and Ohlin has had a profound effect on the theory of international trade. This seminal work led not only to the famous H-O theorem but also to three additional propositions. Two of these, the factor price equalization theorem and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, have been discussed. The final theorem, the Rybczynski theorem, which focuses on changes in factor endowments and the accompanying changes in final products produced, will be developed in Chapter 11.
Several of the assumptions in the H-O model are not always applicable to the real world. For that reason, it is useful to examine assumptions that seem especially critical to the results of the model and to determine the impact of their absence on the H-O result.
A strong assumption in the H-O model is that tastes and preferences are identical in the trading countries. If this is not true, it is no longer possible to predict the pretrade autarky prices and thus the structure of trade. The reason is that each country’s tastes and preferences could cause it to value the products in very different ways. An extreme example of this is often referred to as demand reversal. In Figure 8, demands in the two countries are so different that in country I the price of the good (steel) that intensively uses the relatively abundant factor is actually higher than its price in the trading partner, country II. With the opening of trade, country I would find itself exporting cloth and importing steel from country II because steel is relatively cheaper at international prices. This is illustrated in Figure 8 by the international terms-of-trade line, (PC/PS)int, which is steeper than autarky prices in country I and flatter than autarky prices in country II. This pattern of trade is, of course, the opposite of that predicted by H-O. It will cause the relative price of capital to fall in country I and that of labor to fall in country II. The difference in the nature of demand between these two countries, with each tending to prefer the good intensive in its physically abundant factor, has caused them to trade in a manner opposite to that anticipated by the H-O analysis. While demand patterns seem to be similar throughout the world, especially among similar socioeconomic income classes, differences in tastes and preferences certainly exist. If the differences are sufficiently strong, they can reduce the ability of the H-O model to predict trade and the movement of factor prices. Note, however, that the H-O model would still hold even in this instance if the analysis is restricted to the price definition of relative factor abundance. This occurs because home demand for the product using the abundant factor intensively leads to such a high price for that product and the factor used intensively in its production that the physically abundant factor is the scarce factor from the standpoint of the price definition.
A second assumption crucial to the H-O conclusions is that a commodity is always relatively intensive in a given factor regardless of relative factor prices (the strong-factor-intensity assumption). Critical to this exercise is drawing the curvature of the isoquants so that each possible pair intersects only once (see Figure 1, page 126). Without this assumption, the H-O model cannot always accurately predict the structure of trade, even if technology is the same between countries. A violation of the assumption appears in Figure 9. The degree of substitution between the two factors is sufficiently different between industries (labor and capital can be substituted for each other more easily in cloth production than in steel production) so that we cannot guarantee that a given product will always be relatively intensive in the same factor. To see why this is so, look at panel (b). At (w/r)1, capital is relatively expensive; that is, the price of capital is high and the price of labor is low. With relatively flat isocost lines, producers will minimize costs by using KS1 amounts of capital and LS1 amounts of labor in steel production and KC1 amounts of capital and LC1 of labor in cloth production. The K/L ratio in steel production is greater than that in cloth production, suggesting that steel is the capital-intensive product. Next, suppose that labor is relatively more expensive. This results in a higher w/r ratio, (w/r)2, and a steeper isocost line. Producers attempting to minimize cost will employ KS2 amounts of capital and LS2 amounts of labor in steel production and KC2 amounts of capital and LC2 amounts of labor in cloth production. With this set of relative prices, the K/L ratio for cloth is now larger than the K/L ratio for steel. The factor-intensity comparison between steel and cloth has reversed with this large change in relative factor prices. These commodities are thus not always relatively intensive in the same factor. The H-O model may no longer be able to predict the export good based on relative factor abundance.
Suppose that (w/r)1 applies to country I and (w/r)2 to country II. From H-O, we expect country I (the labor-abundant country in this example) to export cloth (the labor-intensive good) and country II (the capital-abundant country) to export steel (the capital-intensive good). However, when capital is abundant (country II), cloth is the capital-intensive good. We would expect cloth to be country II’s export as well. Predicting trade flows in this two-country case is problematic because factor-intensity reversal (FIR) exists. FIR occurs when a commodity has a different relative factor intensity at different relative factor prices. With one country exporting cloth and the other exporting steel in actual trade, one of them will match the H-O prediction, but the other will not. Factor-intensity reversal could also interfere with factor price equalization, because one of the two countries can end up exporting the good that intensively uses its relatively scarce factor. For example, in Figure 9, country I might end up exporting steel and importing cloth. This will produce upward pressure on the price of capital and downward pressure on wages in country I, much like that occurring in country II. If this happens, relative factor prices in both countries (w/r) will move in the same direction (both will be falling) instead of converging toward each other. In the larger context, FIR helps us understand why it might be possible for a labor-abundant country such as India and a capital-abundant country such as the United States to export the same commodity, steel, for example. The question remains open as to whether FIRs actually exist to any important degree, but most economists doubt that these reversals alone are likely to explain trade patterns that appear to be inconsistent with H-O.
Transportation Costs
A third assumption that is not valid in the real world is that of no transportation costs. Product prices will differ between two locations by the cost of transportation. This is demonstrated page 140by the two-country market graphs for corn in Figure 10. The market price in autarky for corn is lower in France than in Norway. Consequently, Norway has an incentive to buy corn from France. Ignoring transportation costs, these two countries should trade at a common (international) price for corn that will be lower than the price in Norway and higher than the autarky price in France. That will cause the amount of excess supply available for export in France (Q1Q2) to be exactly equal to the excess demand for imports (q1q2) in Norway.
Suppose that we now include transportation costs. If France attempts to pass the entire transportation cost on to Norway, the price of corn in Norway will rise and Norway’s excess demand (and imports) will fall. This leaves France with an inventory of corn it does not want. France will lower its price and, thus, the price including transportation costs in Norway. As this happens, France will find that it now has a smaller amount of corn available for export, an amount more in line with the new quantity demanded in Norway at the higher transportation-inclusive price. Ultimately, the price in Norway will rise above the original international equilibrium price, and the price in France will fall below that price until the amount of France’s desired exports is exactly equal to the amount of Norway’s desired imports. The difference between the price of corn in the two countries will equal exactly the transportation costs involved. Another point is that the participating countries will not necessarily share the transportation costs equally. Ultimately, the incidence of the transportation cost will depend on the elasticities of supply and demand in each country. The more inelastic supply and demand are in the importing country and the more elastic demand and supply are in the exporting country, the larger the relative amount of transportation costs paid by the importing country. Similarly, the more inelastic market conditions are in the exporting country and the more elastic in the importing country, the greater the amount of transportation costs borne by the exporting country. The costs associated with moving goods between countries have been undergoing change in recent years because of new transport technologies and emerging market page 141concerns. Until recently, transportation costs had demonstrated a downward trend because of the use of larger ocean vessels, new cargo handling techniques, and an expanded use of air transport.3 However, in the new globalized world where “quick response” is replacing the holding of large inventories, increased attention is being directed to transport time as well as distance. David L. Hummels and Georg Schauer (2013), using U.S. merchandise import data, estimate that “ocean shipping costs are equivalent to a 3 percent tariff and air shipping costs are equivalent to an 8 percent tariff” (p. 2943). They also estimate that one extra day in transit would be equivalent to an additional tariff in the 0.6–2.1 percent range, depending on the product, because time is valuable to sales. Hummels and Schauer suggest that timely delivery is like an increase in product quality to a consumer, a feature that, in conjunction with a dramatic fall in air transport costs, is consistent with the fact that in recent decades air shipments have increased 2.6 times faster than ocean shipments. The implications of transportation costs do not alter H-O conclusions about the composition of trade. However, the amount of trade and specialization of production will be reduced, and the relative structure of trade could be changed as a result of differences in transportation costs for different types of goods. However, because relative product prices do not equalize between countries, relative factor prices will not equalize and complete factor price equalization cannot be attained. Finally, if transportation costs are sufficiently large, they can prevent trade from taking place, even though commodity autarky prices are clearly different between countries; that is, transportation costs can lead to the presence of nontraded goods.
A fourth assumption important to the H-O analysis has been the presence of perfect competition. This assumption was necessary to guarantee that product prices and factor prices would equalize with trade. Again, we know in the real world that imperfect information, barriers to entry (both natural and contrived), and so forth, lead to imperfect competition of many different forms. Let’s examine briefly how imperfect competition such as monopoly can alter the H-O conclusions about several of the effects of trade. A first case is a variant of the traditional domestic monopoly model. The monopolist maintains the monopoly position at home but at some point chooses to export at world prices. In other words, the monopolist continues to act as a price setter at home but becomes a price taker on the world market. This can occur only if imports are prevented from coming into the country. Assume that the monopolist is maximizing profits at the quantity of output where marginal cost (MC) equals marginal revenue (MR), that is, at P0 and Q0 in Figure 11. If it now becomes possible to export as much as desired at the world price, Pint, what should the monopolist do to maximize profits? Profits are still maximized by equating MC with MR. However, the MR curve now consists of the domestic MR curve down to the Pint curve and the Pint curve beyond that point. Because the monopoly firm can sell all that it wishes at the international price, it has no reason ever to sell at a lower MR. Consequently, production is Q1, where MC = Pint. The quantity Q2 is sold in the domestic market at price P2, and Q1 − Q2 is exported. Because the international price puts a floor on the marginal revenue at all quantities to the right of Q2, the monopolist actually reduces the amount sold in the local market and charges a higher price. In this case, international trade leads to an increased difference between the domestic price and the world price, not a convergence to a single commodity price. The production and factor price effects tend to approach the H-O result as the monopolist acts as a price taker in the world market. However, the domestic market distortion that permits the monopolist to sell with trade at page 142a higher price at home than in autarky inhibits product price equalization and thus factor price equalization.
A second case is simply the application of pure monopolistic price discrimination to international trade. In this case, we have a single world supplier faced with how to distribute output among several countries and what price to charge in each. It is assumed that the monopolist is a profit maximizer, that the markets in the various countries can be kept separate (i.e., arbitrage cannot take place between markets), and that the elasticities of demand differ between the various markets. Assume that the monopolist is faced with two markets (see Figure 12). Assume also that the marginal cost of the monopolist is constant. What is the optimal amount to sell in each market? The level of total output is equal to the sum of the optimal amount of sales in each market. To maximize profits, the monopolist locates the quantity in each market at which MC = MR. The profit maximization criterion thus indicates that at a marginal cost of MC*, the quantity QI should be sold in country I at PI, and QII in country II at PII. A higher price will be charged in the market where demand is less elastic. Pure price discrimination leads to the charging of different prices in different markets and tends to reduce the degree of factor price equalization that takes place. (Remember that this type of discrimination exists only as long as there is no arbitrage between markets.) Although the presence of a single world supplier of a product is very rare, it is not uncommon for several major suppliers to band together and form a cartel. This arrangement allows them to behave economically as a single world supplier and to price-discriminate between markets.
It has been assumed up to this point that factors are completely mobile between different uses in production within a country. This assumption permits production adjustments to move smoothly along the PPF in response to changes in relative product prices. Often, page 143however, it is not easy or even possible for factors to be moved from the production of one product to another (e.g., from wheat to automobile production). With some degree of factor immobility, at least in the short run, the nature of the adjustment to international trade is altered from that suggested in the H-O framework. Adjustment to trade has been analyzed in this instance through the use of the specific-factors model.
The specific-factors model (SF model) is an attempt to explore the implications of short-run factor immobility between sectors in an H-O context. In the short run, it assumes that there are three factors of production, not two. The three factors in industries X and Y are: (a) labor, which is mobile and can be used to produce either good X or good Y; (b) capital in industry X, KX, which can be employed in that industry but not in industry Y; and (c) capital in industry Y, KY, which cannot be used in industry X. The SF model acknowledges that, in practice, it takes time for capital to be depreciated in one industry and reemployed in another. The contrast between the assumptions of the SF model and those of the H-O model can be shown in an Edgeworth box diagram (see Figure 13). In panel (a) the factors are freely mobile between sectors, and the production contract curve has smooth curvature and connects the lower-left and upper-right origins of the box. This is the typical Edgeworth box. Panel (b) illustrates the Edgeworth box in the context of the SF model. Because capital is fixed in industry X, that amount of fixed capital is shown by the vertical distance No matter what amount of good X is produced, quantity of capital is used in industry X. Similarly, the fixed capital used in industry Y is shown by the vertical distance Hence, in the SF model, the contract curve is the horizontal liThe different contract curves in the two situations will be associated with different PPFs, because PPFs are derived from contract curves (see Chapter 5). In Figure 14, the PPF labeled RA′S is the PPF associated with the normal contract curve of both panels of Figure 13. The PPF labeled TA′V represents the PPF associated with the specific-factors contract curve This “new” PPF is coincident with the “normal” PPF only at point A′. A movement from point A to point B on the normal contract curve in Figure 13(b) yields a movement from point A′ to point B′ on the normal PPF in Figure 14, while a movement from A to C on the specific-factors contract curve results in a movement from point A′ to point C′. But the output of good Y at B or B′ (amount y2) in the normal situation will be associated with less output of good X under the specific-factors situation than under the normal or mobile-factors situation. This difference in output of X reflects the fact that isoquant y2 in Figure 13(b) is associated with isoquant x2 on the normal contract curve but only with the smaller quantity of X on isoquant x3 (at point C) on the specific-factors contract curve. Because analogous contrasts can be made with all other points on the two different contract curves in Figure 13(b), it follows that the specific-factors PPF in Figure 14 will lie inside the normal PPF except at point A. In fact, in the United States at present, a case can be made that not only is capital a specific factor, but labor also may be immobile in the sense of possessing particular skills. In this situation there may be potential for the country to be even further “inside” its normal PPF, as evidenced by the recent recession. We do not pursue this additional immobility complication in this chapter, however.
Economists know from their understanding of market behaviour that imperfect competition leads to a reduction in quantity sold and an increase in price, as well as to the possibility of price discrimination. An historical example of this latter behavior was the incandescent electric lamp cartel, where firms in different countries acted jointly as a monopoly. A 1939 U.S. Tariff Commission study indicated the severe price discrimination practices of this cartel, as the accompanying table shows. The cartel clearly kept prices from equalizing across countries, inhibiting any tendency toward factor price equalization. A current example of monopolistic behavior came to light when the European Union (EU) in 2015 levied formal charges against Russian government–controlled natural gas supplier Gazprom, accusing the firm of blocking competition and charging unfair prices in its sales to countries in southern and eastern Europe. Monopolistic price discrimination was alleged, because, in comparison with the $341 average price per cubic meter of natural gas charged to the EU, Gazprom charged, for example, 21.7 percent more in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 11.1 percent more in Poland, 5.3 percent less in Germany, and 9.7 percent less in the Slovak Republic. Such price differences clearly could not exist if free resale of natural gas between countries were possible. Until very recently, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), mostly Middle-Eastern countries, has been a relatively strong international cartel. It was successful in raising prices dramatically through production controls and the exercise of market power in the two oil shocks of 1973–1974 and 1979–1980. The average price for oil (the benchmark Brent crude oil price) was $3.61 per barrel in 1972, $4.25 in 1973, and $12.93 in 1974. By 1978 the price was $14.26 per barrel, and it rose to $32.11 in 1979 and $37.89 in 1980. Oil prices then fell because of consumer conservation, new sources of supply from Mexico, the North Sea, and Alaska; and switches to alternative fuels. By 1986 crude prices had fallen to $14.43; they then fell, after some increase in the early 1990s, to $12.72 in 1998. OPEC then attempted to restrict output, and the price averaged $28.31 in 2000. The decision by OPEC to cut output by 10 percent in early 2004, as well as growth in demand, led to an average price of $54.43 in 2005. The price rose to $97.66 by 2008 but then decreased due to the Great Recession to $61.86 in 2008 and $79.63 in 2009. However, the average oil price subsequently rose to above $100 per barrel in 2011, 2012, and 2013. It reached about $115 in June 2014 but then, with the slowdown of GDP growth in many countries and the emergence of huge new supplies of shale oil in the United States, a glut occurred and the price fell to about $50 per barrel in early 2015. Effective cartels clearly are not permanent in nature.
The implication of the immobility of capital in an H-O context can be seen by comparing the impact on the rates of return to the factors of production when a country moves from autarky to trade. Suppose we have the normal situation of a country with full mobility of all factors of production. If the country is located at point A in Figure 13(b) in autarky, then an opening of the country to trade involving specialization in the labor-intensive good X will result, for example, in a movement from A to B in Figure 13(b) or from A′ to B′ in Figure 14. This movement will bid up the price of labor and reduce the price of capital as expanding industry X seeks to acquire relatively more labor and contracting industry Y is releasing relatively more capital. After the adjustment, at point B in Figure 13(b), the ratio of capital to labor in each industry has risen. With the rise in the K/L ratio in each industry, each worker in each industry has relatively more capital to work with, so the worker is more productive; thus, productivity and wages rise. The flip side of the rise in wages is the fall in the real return to capital. The important policy implication in the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin, full-factor mobility situation is that the country’s abundant factor prefers free trade to autarky and that the country’s scarce factor prefers autarky to free trade. Even though the country as a whole gains from trade, some part of the economy (the scarce factor) will have an incentive to argue for protection. What is the consequence of trade for factor returns in the specific-factors model? With autarky at point A in Figure 13(b) and the opening of the country to trade, labor-intensive industry X expands because of the higher price of X and capital-intensive industry Y contracts because of the lower price of Y. Production tends to move to the right from point A in the direction of a point such as point C on the SF contract curve. The increased demand for labor will bid up the money wage of all labor. However, the direction of movement of the return to capital depends on which industry is being considered. Industry X has increased its demand for capital, but the supply of capital is fixed at Hence, the return to capital in X rises with the opening of the country to trade. However, the demand for capital in industry Y falls because some of good Y is now imported rather than produced at home. Thus, the demand for capital in industry Y decreases, while its supply of capital is fixed. The return to capital in Y therefore falls. These income distribution effects of trade are obviously different from those of the traditional H-O model. There, capital as a whole suffered a decline in its return, but in the SF model capital in X gains and capital in Y loses. The scarce factor of production will not be unanimously opposed to moving from autarky to trade. Owners of capital in industry Y will argue against free trade, while those in industry X will argue in favor of it. This situation may indeed be more realistic than the traditional H-O type of model, especially in the short run, where all of one factor was opposed to trade and all of the other factor favored it. A final note is necessary about the return to labor. Saying that the money wage for labor has risen does not mean that labor’s real wage has risen. Consider the money wage in industry X, which equals the money wage in industry Y with competition. Remember that the money wage equals the price of the product times the marginal physical product of labor, thus, w = (PX)(MPPLX). With trade, MPPLX falls, because more labor is being used with the fixed amount of capital In other words, each worker has less capital to work with. Because w = (PX)(MPPLX), this means that w/PX has fallen because (w/PX) = MPPLX. The fall in w/PX simply indicates that money wages have not risen as much as the price of page 147good X. Workers who consume only good X are worse off because their real wages have declined. Analogously, w/PY rises; thus, if workers consume only good Y, their real wages have risen. The direction of the real return for a worker therefore depends on the bundle of goods being consumed. The SF model yields conclusions on the winners and losers from free trade that may be more consonant than traditional H-O trade theory with what we observe in the real world. (See Concept Box 1 for a more thorough discussion of the impact of trade on labor’s real wage in the specific-factors model.)
It is evident that several other assumptions, such as constant returns to scale, identical technology, and the absence of policy obstacles to trade, also are not always applicable to the real world. To the extent that they are not, the conclusions of the H-O model are compromised. Several of these conditions will be examined further in Chapter 10 and in later chapters on trade policy.
As noted in the text, the direction of movement of the real return to a worker when a country is opened to trade in the specific-factors model depends on that worker’s consumption pattern. This conclusion is illustrated in Figure 15. The figure portrays the demand for labor by the X industry and by the Y industry. Each industry’s demand for labor reflects the fact that a firm will hire a worker as long as the worker’s contribution to the firm’s revenue (the marginal physical product of labor times the price of the output) exceeds the cost to the firm (the wage rate). Thus, in the figure, curve DLX is the demand curve for labor by firms in the X industry (with DLX = MPPLX × PX), and DLY is the demand curve for labor by firms in the Y industry (with DLY = MPPLY × PY). These curves are downward sloping. As the wage rate falls, industry X hires more labor (reading rightward from origin 0); alternatively, as more labor is added to the fixed amount of other inputs, the MPPLX falls and the additional labor will be hired only if the wage rate is reduced. Curve DLY indicates the demand curve for labor by the Y industry but, for this industry, the quantity of labor is read in the leftward direction from the origin 0′.
Given the two demand curves in this two-good economy and given that labor is mobile between the two sectors, the equilibrium point in the labor market occurs at wage rate 0WE (which equals wage rate 0′WE). At this wage rate, quantity 0L1 of labor is employed in industry X and quantity of labor L10′ is employed in industry Y, thus exhausting the entire stock of labor 00′. If the wage rate were higher than WE, some labor would be unemployed and the wage would fall to WE. This WE equilibrium in the economy is posited as the situation when the country is in autarky. Suppose that this country is now opened to international trade and that good X is the export good and good Y is the import good. This means that PX/PY in the world market exceeds the autarky PX/PY. Let us assume that PX/PY is 10 percent higher in the world market than in autarky. For simplicity, we’ll say that PX is 10 percent higher in the world market than at home and that PY is the same in the world market as at home. (In actual practice, PX would be higher and PY would be lower in the world market than at home, but the ratio PX/PY would be 10 percent higher in the world market regardless of the absolute particular values of PX and PY. Our increase of PX by 10 percent with no change in PY is a simplification that makes the analysis less complicated but does not alter any central conclusions.) If PX increases by 10 percent, then, in Figure 15, DLX shifts vertically upward by 10 percent because DLX = MPPLX × PX and PX has gone up by 10 percent. With this upward shift in demand for labor by the X industry from DLX to D′LX, employment rises in the X industry from amount 0L1 to amount 0L2. The L1L2 of new labor working in the X industry is labor that has been released from the contracting Y industry, so that the remaining labor in Y is L20′. As is evident in the graph, the money wage has risen in both industries to 0W′E (which equals 0′W′E). Because the money wage has risen, does this mean that all workers are better off? No! Remember that, for welfare conclusions, it is the real wage that is critical, not the money wage. If the money wage had risen by 10 percent, it would have risen by a distance equal to WEW3, or by the equivalent distance EG. In fact, the money wage has risen by the smaller amount WEW′E or, equivalently, by distance EF. Hence, if a worker consumes only the X good, the price of X increased by 10 percent but the worker’s money wage increased by less than 10 percent, meaning that that worker has experienced a decline in the real wage. On the other hand, if the worker consumes only the import good, the money wage has risen by less than 10 percent but the price of Y has not changed, meaning that that worker has experienced a rise in the real wage. Given this analysis, it is clear that the following general statements can be made with respect to the specific-factors model. If a worker’s consumption bundle is heavily tilted toward the export good, then that worker will tend to have a reduced real wage because of the opening of the country to trade and will hence tend to be less well off. If a worker’s consumption bundle is heavily tilted toward the import good, that worker will tend to have an increased real wage because of the opening of the country to trade and will tend to be better off.
This chapter first examined the underlying basis for differences in relative prices in autarky. Country differences in demand, technology, and factor abundance contribute to possible differences in relative prices in autarky. Attention then focused on the Heckscher-Ohlin explanation of trade, factor price equalization, and income distribution effects of trade. Building on a rigorous set of assumptions, Heckscher-Ohlin demonstrated that differences in relative factor endowments are sufficient to generate a basis for trade, even if there are no country differences in technology or demand conditions. Their model allowed them not only to predict the pattern of trade based on initial factor endowments but also to demonstrate that trade would lead to an equalization of factor prices between trading countries. Stolper-Samuelson pointed out that the same relative factor price movements would lead to an improvement in real income for owners of the abundant factor and a worsening position for owners of the scarce factor. Several theoretical qualifications on the role of tastes and preferences, factor intensity of products, transportation costs, imperfect competition, and factor immobility were briefly discussed. Reflection on the limitations imposed by these assumptions helps one to understand why the pattern and effects of international trade are not always what we might expect from the H-O theory. These limitations do not destroy the basic link between relative factor abundance and the pattern of trade. They do, however, influence the degree to which these links hold and are observed. Chapter 9 examines the validity of the factor endowments approach in the real world.
It is common to hear trade theories criticized for not being “relevant to the real world” or for having “unrealistic assumptions.” This has led researchers such as Leamer and Levinson (1995) to assert that empirical work on trade has had very little influence on trade theories and to encourage their colleagues to “Estimate, don’t test.” They propose that researchers should attempt to learn from real-world data rather than simply accepting or rejecting an abstract hypothesis. Rather than using the lack of relevance to the real world as a reason to ignore trade theory, it should serve as a motivation for empirical testing. Davis and Weinstein (1996, p. 434) offer a more encouraging view of empirical work. “…look for ways of weakening the strict assumptions of the theory …to find a version that does in fact work …[W]e should learn which of the assumptions …are most crucial, and to which types of data sets one can sensibly apply the various versions of the theory.”1 This chapter examines the empirical tests of the Heckscher-Ohlin predictions in an attempt to find which of the often strict assumptions are crucial. You will see that there is not a consensus among economists on the degree to which relative factor endowments explain international trade flows and the consequences of trade flows. As developed in Chapter 8, the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem states that a country will export goods that use relatively intensively the country’s relatively abundant factor of production and will import goods that use relatively intensively the country’s relatively scarce factor of production. In this chapter, we review some empirical tests of this seemingly straightforward and commonsense hypothesis. The literature has produced some conflicting results on the real-world validity of the H-O theorem. The most surprising result of one early test was that the world’s largest trader, the United States, did not trade according to the Heckscher-Ohlin pattern. Explanations are given on why this surprising result might have occurred. We then review tests for other countries and more recent work on trade patterns. In addition, we survey the current controversy regarding the extent to which H-O-type trade has contributed to the increasing income inequality in developed countries in recent years, especially in the United States.
The first major test of the H-O theorem was conducted by Wassily W. Leontief and published in 1953. This comprehensive test has influenced empirical research in this area ever since. Leontief made use of his own invention—an input-output table—to test the H-O prediction. An input-output table provides details, for all industries in an economy, of the flows of output of each industry to all other industries, the purchases of inputs from all other industries, and the purchases of factor services. In addition, the table can be used to indicate not only the “direct factor requirements” of any given industry—the capital and labor used with intermediate goods in the particular stage of production—but also the total factor requirements. The total requirements include the direct requirements as well as the capital and labor used in the supplying industries of all inputs to the industry page 152(the “indirect factor requirements”). The table is very useful for calculating the aggregate country requirements of capital and labor for producing a bundle of goods such as exports and import substitutes. To evaluate the H-O prediction for the United States, Leontief imagined a situation where, using 1947 data, the United States simultaneously reduced its exports and imports proportionately by a total of $1 million each. The input-output table made it possible to determine how much capital (K) and labor (L) would be released from producing exports and how much capital and labor would be required to produce at home the $1 million of goods no longer being imported. (Leontief confined his analysis to “competitive imports,” meaning that he did not include goods that the United States did not produce at home, such as bananas.) Given the estimates of the K and L released from reducing exports and required to reproduce imports, a comparison could be made between them. Because the United States was thought to be a relatively capital-abundant country, the expectation from the statistical analysis was that the K/L ratio of the released factors from the export reduction would be greater than the K/L ratio of the factors required to produce the forgone imports. This expectation could be evaluated as to its validity through the concept of the Leontief statistic, which is defined as
where (K/L)M refers to the capital/labor ratio used in a country to produce import-competing goods and (K/L)X refers to the capital/labor ratio used to produce exports. According to the H-O theorem, a relatively capital-abundant country would have a Leontief statistic with a value less than 1.0 (since the denominator would be larger than the numerator) and a relatively labor-abundant country would have a Leontief statistic greater than 1.0. Leontief’s results were startling. He found that the hypothesized reduction of U.S. exports would release $2.55 million worth of capital and 182.3 years of labor-time, for a (K/L)X of approximately $14,000 per labor-year. On the import side, to produce the forgone imports would require $3.09 million worth of capital and 170.0 years of labor-time, yielding a (K/L)M of approximately $18,200 per labor-year. Thus, the Leontief statistic for the United States was 1.3 totally unexpected for a relatively capital-abundant country. A disaggregated analysis of his results also supported these findings. The most important export industries tended to have lower K/L ratios and higher labor requirements and lower capital requirements per dollar of output than did the most important import-competing industries. Thus, the seemingly commonsense notion that a country abundant in capital would export capital-intensive goods and import labor-intensive goods was seriously called into question. The doubt cast on the widely accepted Heckscher-Ohlin theorem by this study became known as the Leontief paradox.
Leontief’s results have produced many studies seeking to explain why these unexpected findings might have occurred. In this section, we briefly discuss the more well-known “explanations.”
The concept of demand reversal was introduced in Chapter 8. In demand reversal, demand patterns across trading partners differ to such an extent that trade does not follow the H-O pattern when the physical definition of relative factor abundance is used. The relative preference of a country for goods made with its physically abundant factor (called “own-intensity preference”) offers one explanation for the Leontief paradox page 153if we hypothesize that the United States has relative preference for capital-intensive goods and that U.S. trading partners have relative preference for labor-intensive goods. The U.S. demand for capital-intensive goods bids up the price of those goods until the U.S. comparative advantage lies in labor-intensive goods. A similar process occurs in trading partners, giving them a comparative advantage in capital-intensive goods. The validity of demand reversal as an explanation of the Leontief paradox is an empirical question. However, considerable dissimilarity (which seems unlikely in practice) is required for the demand reversal explanation to be of value in understanding the paradox. Further, the presence of demand reversal would imply that demand within the United States for labor-intensive goods would be relatively low and therefore U.S. wages also would be relatively low—which is not consistent with observed wage rates across countries. Thus, other reasons for the Leontief result need to be explored.
As noted in Chapter 8, factor-intensity reversal (FIR) occurs when a good is produced in one country by relatively capital-intensive methods but is produced in another country by relatively labor-intensive methods. It is not possible to specify unambiguously which good is capital intensive and which is labor intensive, and the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem can be valid for only one of the two countries. For example, consider a situation where X is the K-intensive good in country I but is the L-intensive good in country II (and hence Y is the L-intensive good in country I but is the K-intensive good in country II) and country I is the relatively K-abundant country. If country I is exporting X to II, then the Heckscher-Ohlin prediction is correct for country I but it cannot be correct for country II, because country II, the L-abundant country, must be exporting good Y to country I (because both countries cannot be exporting X in this two-country H-O model). However, good Y is the K-intensive good in country II, and therefore country II is not conforming to the H-O theorem. In the context of the Leontief paradox, the FIR suggests that, although U.S. import goods might have been produced labor intensively overseas, the production process of these goods in the United States was relatively capital intensive. The trading partners (being labor-abundant) were conforming to H-O when they exported the goods, but the United States was not conforming to H-O. The validity of this explanation for the occurrence of the Leontief paradox is also an empirical question. The literature is somewhat divided on the matter of whether factor intensity reversals occur with any frequency, and we cannot rule them out altogether. The most famous test was conducted by B. S. Minhas (1962) for the United States and Japan using 1947 and 1951 data for 20 industries. Suppose that we consider the same 20 industries, that we have the K/L ratio employed in each country in each of the 20 industries, and that we rank the 20 industries in descending order in each country according to K/L ratios (as Minhas did). For example, in the United States (using total capital and labor requirements) petroleum products constituted the most capital-intensive industry (it had the highest K/L ratio), coal products ranked number 2, iron and steel ranked number 8, textiles ranked number 11, shipbuilding ranked number 15, leather ranked number 19, and so forth. If there are no FIRs, then the rankings for Japan would be the same as those for the United States. Statistically, this means that the rank correlation coefficient between the U.S. ranking and the Japanese ranking would be 1.0. (Note: If two rankings are identical, the correlation coefficient between them is 1.0; if they are perfectly opposite to each other, the coefficient is −1.0; and if there is no association between the two rankings whatsoever, the rank correlation coefficient is 0.) When Minhas calculated this correlation coefficient using total factor requirements, he obtained a rank correlation coefficient of only 0.328. (This reflects that in Japan iron and steel was number 3 instead of 8, shipbuilding was number 7 instead of 15, etc.) For “direct” requirements only, the coefficient was higher but still only 0.730. Thus, doubt can be cast on the “no FIRs” assumption of Heckscher-Ohlin. However, economists such as G. C. Hufbauer (1966) and D. S. Ball (1966) pointed out that if the differences in land availability and agriculture in the two countries and the influence of these differences on the relative employment of K and L are allowed for, then the rank correlation coefficients are much closer to 1.0. page 154
Another study that examined the potential likelihood of factor-intensity reversals in the real world is that of Matthias Lücke (1994). Lücke notes that empirical work on the causes of trade patterns often relies on the assumption that U.S. relative factor intensities across industries are representative of relative factor intensities across industries in other countries. To test whether this assumption is valid, Lücke gathered data on 22 manufacturing industries in 37 industrialized and developing countries (the same 22 industries in each country). He then calculated the dispersion across these industries in each country of what he called “total capital intensity” (value added per employee), “human capital intensity” (wages per employee), and “physical capital intensity” (non-wage value added per employee). The resulting dispersion values within each country were then correlated with the dispersion in intensity of these same industries within the United States. Lücke’s hypothesis was that a significantly positive correlation coefficient (a linear correlation to represent the structure of intensities in general, not a rank correlation) between the dispersion in any given country and the dispersion in the United States would suggest that relative factor intensities in manufacturing industries are broadly similar between the countries and thus relative factor-intensity reversals in general are unlikely. Using the three different measures of intensity (total capital intensity, human capital intensity, and physical capital intensity) and two different time periods, Lücke was able, given data limitations, to calculate 192 different correlation coefficients between the factor-intensity dispersion in the 36 other countries and the factor-intensity dispersion in the United States. All but eight of the coefficients were positive in a statistically significant sense. He regarded his results as highly supportive of the notion that the structure of factor intensities in manufacturing industries in general in the 36 other countries was indeed very similar to that structure in the United States. Hence, factor-intensity reversals across countries in the manufacturing sector seemed very unlikely. A more recent investigation (2011) pertaining to factor-intensity reversal is that of Yoshinori Kurokawa (2011). Kurokawa’s work takes a different approach from most factor-intensity reversal studies in that it focuses on a possible factor-intensity reversal between relatively high-skilled labor and relatively low-skilled labor rather than on a possible reversal between relative capital- and labor-intensity. He dealt with U.S.–Mexican trade in 1994 and in 2000 (as NAFTA—the North American Free Trade Agreement—was being implemented). He divided manufacturing industries into two mutually exclusive categories—the “electronics” industry and all other industries, with the latter being very broadly classified as the “non-electronics” industry. Between 1994 and 2000, the electronics industry in the United States experienced a very large increase in its net exports to Mexico, at the same time that net imports into the United States from Mexico of non-electronic goods increased dramatically. Within this two-industry context of the electronics industry and the non-electronics industry, Kurokawa then examines the relative skill intensity in the two industries in 1994 and 2000 by calculating the ratio of the number of non-production workers in an industry to the number of production workers in the industry. Non-production workers are roughly designed to represent high-skill workers, and the production workers are roughly designed to represent low-skill workers. Non-production workers are generally viewed as having greater educational attainment than production workers. Kurokawa then compares this ratio in the two broad industries in each of the two countries with the average skill intensity figure for each country as a whole. Unsurprisingly, Kurokawa finds that the skill intensity in electronics in the United States is above the U.S. average skill intensity and that the skill intensity in non-electronics is below the U.S. average. Hence, for the United States, exports to Mexico conform to Heckscher-Ohlin since the United States is generally thought to be relatively more well-endowed with high-skill labor than is Mexico and the United States is exporting the relatively high-skill intensive product to Mexico. With respect to Mexico, the results are indeed surprising. Kurokawa determines that, in both 1994 and 2000, the ratio of non-production workers to production workers in non-electronics was higher than the average for Mexico, while that ratio was lower in electronics than the Mexican average. Hence, by this measure, the non-electronics industry in Mexico utilized relatively high-skill labor compared to the electronics industry (and thus the electronics industry utilized relatively low-skill labor compared to the non-electronics industry). Mexico was thus exporting its relatively high-skill-intensive product to the United States whereas the country is generally viewed as low-skill abundant relative to the United States—not in conformity with Heckscher-Ohlin. How is this surprising page 155result possible? Kurokawa’s explanation is that the result reflects a factor-intensity reversal—the electronics industry is relatively high-skill intensive in the United States compared to non-electronics, while at the same time electronics is relatively low-skill intensive compared to the non-electronics industry in Mexico. This conclusion is consistent with the earlier discussion in this chapter that, with a factor-intensity reversal, only one of the two countries can conform to Heckscher-Ohlin. It is also consistent with Kurokawa’s observation that the wages of high-skill workers relative to low-skill workers increased in both the United States and Mexico during this period—a phenomenon which fits with our earlier point that, with a factor-intensity reversal, the tendency for trade to lead toward factor price equalization disappears. The Kurokawa study would suggest that further analysis is needed, especially with regard to the point that the electronics industry is less skill-intensive in Mexico than the skill-intensity level of other industries. Sources: Matthias Lücke, “A Note on Empirical Evidence on Factor Intensity Reversals in Manufacturing,” Economia Internazionale 47, no. 1 (February 1994), pp. 51–54; Yoshinori Kurokawa, “Is a Skill Intensity Reversal a Mere Theoretical Curiosum? Evidence from the US and Mexico,” Economics Letters 112, no. 2 (August 2011), pp. 151–54.
This explanation for the Leontief paradox focuses on the factor intensity of the goods that primarily receive tariff (and other trade barrier) protection in the United States. From Heckscher-Ohlin and the accompanying Stolper-Samuelson theorem we learned that the opening of a country to trade increases the real return of the abundant factor and decreases the real return of the scarce factor. This suggests that, in the United States, labor will be more protectionist than will owners of capital (which is the case). Therefore, U.S. trade barriers tend to hit hardest the imports of relatively labor-intensive goods. With these goods restricted, the hypothesis is that the composition of the U.S. import bundle is relatively more capital intensive than would otherwise be the case because labor-intensive goods are kept out by protection. Thus, the Leontief result might have been in part a reflection of the tariff structure of the United States and not an indication of the free-trade pattern that might conform to Heckscher-Ohlin. Can this argument account for the occurrence of the Leontief paradox? In a 1971 study, Robert Baldwin recognized the possible role of tariffs and estimated that the K/L ratio in U.S. imports would be about 5 percent lower if this effect were incorporated. While allowance for the tariff structure works toward reducing the extent of the paradox, it seemed unable to remove it fully.
In this explanation of the Leontief paradox, the basic point is that the use of “labor” as a factor of production may involve a category that is too aggregative, because there are many different kinds and qualities of labor. One early test involving this approach was conducted by Donald Keesing (1966). Keesing divided labor into eight different categories. page 156For example, category I (scientists and engineers) was regarded as the most skilled labor (we have unsuccessfully searched for a listing of economists in this category!), while category II (technicians and draftsmen) was regarded as the second most skilled. This listing continued through category VIII (unskilled and semiskilled workers). Keesing then compared U.S. labor requirements in export- and import-competing industries with those of 13 other countries for 1962. He found that U.S. exports embodied a higher proportion of category I workers and a lower proportion of category VIII workers than the exports of other countries. Similarly, on the import side, the United States used the smallest fraction of category I workers and the largest fraction of category VIII workers. This type of test suggests that the Leontief paradox may have occurred because a two-factor test was employed instead of a test with a larger number of factors (with each skill category of labor regarded as a distinct factor of production). Perhaps the United States is skilled labor abundant (as well as capital abundant) and unskilled labor scarce in its factor endowments. If so, the U.S. trade pattern conformed to Heckscher-Ohlin because the United States was exporting goods that were relatively intensive in skilled labor and importing goods that were relatively intensive in unskilled labor. Other tests have confirmed the general impressions from the Keesing analysis. For example, Robert Baldwin’s study (1971) found that, compared with import-competing industries, export industries had a higher proportion of workers with 13 or more years of schooling. On the other hand, compared with export industries, import-competing industries had a higher proportion of workers with eight years of schooling or less. Using data from the 1970s and early 1980s, Staiger, Deardorff, and Stern (1988) estimated that a move to free trade by the United States would lead to a reduction in demand for operatives and an expansion of demand for scientists, engineers, and physical capital. These results of eliminating trade restrictions are also consistent with an H-O multifactor explanation of trade that has no Leontief paradox. Indeed, many tests of this type have suggested that it is necessary to go beyond a two-factor model to test whether the U.S. trade pattern conforms to Heckscher-Ohlin.
This explanation also builds around the notion that a two-factor test is too restrictive for proper assessment of the empirical validity of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. In this case, the additional factor is “natural resources.” In the context of the Leontief paradox, many of the import-competing goods labeled as “capital intensive” were really “natural resource intensive.” Leontief was assessing the factor requirements for producing imports at home and found that this production required the use of capital-intensive production processes; but in industries such as petroleum products, coal products, and iron and steel, domestic production of the goods involves a great deal of natural resources as well as capital. For Leontief, production of these import-competing goods involved capital-intensive production [raising (K/L)M in the calculation of the Leontief statistic] because his was a two-factor test. However, the “true” intensity of the goods produced might not be in capital but in natural resources. If we were able to identify the true factor intensity, we might conclude that the United States was importing natural-resource-intensive products. If the United States is relatively scarce in its endowment of natural resources, then there is no paradox with Heckscher-Ohlin.
The importance of natural resources has been confirmed in some empirical tests. For example, James Hartigan (1981) performed Leontief-type tests for U.S. trade for 1947 and 1951. A paradox existed in general, but not when natural-resource-intensive industries were deleted from the tests. Without natural-resource industries, U.S. trade yielded a Leontief statistic of 0.917 for 1947 and 0.881 for 1951. These results are not “paradoxical.” Leontief himself (1956) also discovered that adjustment for natural resources could reverse the paradox. On the other hand, Robert Baldwin (1971) found that accounting for page 157natural resources reduced the paradox but did not eliminate it. Thus, there is uncertainty about the relative importance of the “natural resources as a third factor” explanation of the Leontief paradox.
More Recent Tests of the Heckscher- Ohlin Theorem
The paradox found by Leontief has spawned many, many investigations into the question of the validity of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem in predicting trade patterns. We will mention only a few of these studies here, but even our limited discussion should suffice to indicate that the question of the empirical validity of H-O continues to be an unanswered one. This ambiguity was established early on when some tests utilizing Leontief’s approach—Tatemoto and Ichimura (1959) for Japan, Stolper and Roskamp (1961) for East Germany, and Rosefielde (1974) for the Soviet Union—found support for the theorem, because factor intensities of trade flows matched expectations from factor endowments, while other studies—Wahl (1961) for Canada and Bharadwaj (1962) for India—yielded “surprising,” unexpected results. (For example, India’s exports to the United States were found to be relatively capital intensive and India’s imports from the United States were found to be relatively labor intensive!) With respect to the United States, Robert Baldwin (1971, p. 134) found, for 1962 trade, a Leontief statistic of 1.27; when agriculture was excluded, the figure rose to 1.41, and when natural resource industries were excluded, the Leontief statistic fell to 1.04. Thus, in all cases (although only barely so when natural resource industries were excluded), the paradox still existed. However, utilizing a different approach, Harkness and Kyle (1975) found that, if natural resource industries are excluded, a U.S. industry had a greater probability of being a positive net exporter (where net exports = exports minus imports of the industry’s product) if, among other characteristics, it utilized a higher ratio of capital to labor in production. This does not suggest a paradox because the United States was thought to be relatively capital abundant and relatively labor scarce. In addition, an industry had a higher probability of being a positive net exporter if it had a higher ratio of scientists and engineers in its labor force, which lends support to a “labor skills” or “human capital” explanation of the U.S. trade pattern. An important role for human capital was also uncovered by Stern and Maskus (1981). They attempted to explain the net export position of U.S. industries over the years 1958–1976, and they found the size of net exports of an industry to be positively correlated with the amount of human capital used in the industry. They also found the size of net exports to be negatively correlated with the amount of labor in the industry and sometimes, although not always, negatively correlated with the amount of physical capital used in the industry. (In affirmation of the traditional H-O prediction, positive net exports were in fact positively associated with physical capital in some years.) A recent study by Julien Gourdon of the World Bank (2009) examined relative factor endowments as predictors of whether countries would be net exporters or net importers of goods in various product categories. He examined the endowments and trade patterns of 71 countries over the period from 1960 to 2000. Factor endowments for any given country were measured relative to world factor endowments, and factors were broken into the categories of arable land per inhabitant, capital stock per worker, and three types of labor based on differing levels of skill. Commodities were classified into groupings such as agricultural products, processed food products, manufactured goods intensive in capital, and manufactured products intensive in unskilled labor. The results with respect to the predictions of the correct sign between the relevant endowments and net exports or net imports of the given products were encouraging—for example, the correct sign was obtained 56 percent of the time for unskilled labor-intensive manufactured products, 70 percent of the time for page 158agricultural products, 71 percent of the time in capital-intensive manufactured products, 72 percent of the time in skilled labor-intensive products, and 85 percent of the time in what he called technology-intensive products. Gourdon then added variables associated with newer, post–Heckscher-Ohlin theories, such as consumer preferences and economies of scale (discussed in Chapter 10), and the results were even better for these endowments-plus-newer-variables tests. In an overview, Gourdon indicated that, over time, endowments are indeed important for determining trade and that an increasing role in trade and specialization is being played by different types of labor skills. An interesting study that seemed to provide strong support for the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem was conducted by Nicholas Tsounis (2003). This study focused on whether Heckscher-Ohlin is valid empirically on a bilateral basis (i.e., in the trade of a country with individual trading partner countries rather than in the country’s total trade). Greece was the “home” country whose bilateral trade patterns were being examined, and the selected trading partners were the 11 other European Union countries during the trading time period being considered, 1988 and 1989. (The trading partners were Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.) First, utilizing capital stock/investment data and an assumed depreciation rate of capital together with information on the number of working persons, Tsounis calculated the factor endowment ratio, K/L, for each country. He then divided this K/L result for each trading partner country by the Greek K/L endowment ratio. For example, the 1988 ratio for France was 2.82, meaning that France’s endowment of capital to labor was nearly three times Greece’s endowment of capital to labor. For every trading partner European Union (EU) country except for Portugal, the ratio always exceeded 1.00 (Portugal’s ratio was 0.72 in 1988 and 0.75 in 1989). Thus, Greece was relatively labor-abundant in comparison with each of its EU trading partners except for Portugal. Using an input-output table for each country, Tsounis calculated the Leontief statistic for Greece in its trade with the partner countries. In all cases except in Greek trade with Portugal, the Leontief statistic indicated that Greek imports from the EU trading partner were more capital-intensive (less labor-intensive) than were Greek exports to that trading partner. In the case of Portugal, the opposite (by a very slim margin) was found. Hence, on a bilateral basis, Greece’s trading pattern with each of its EU partners seemed to conform to Heckscher-Ohlin.
Other studies have also moved beyond calculating Leontief statistics and often beyond examining only the United States. Many factors of production in many countries have been included. Calculations are first made (using input-output tables) of the quantity of any given factor needed to produce the goods contained in any given country’s aggregate output bundle (i.e., the supply of the factor’s services embodied in production). This requirement is then compared with the demand for the given factor embodied in the country’s existing aggregate consumption bundle. If the total production requirement for any given factor exceeds the total consumption requirement, then (with assumed full employment of the factor) the country must, on balance, be exporting the services of that factor; if the total consumption requirement exceeds the total production requirement, then the country must, on balance, be importing the services of the given factor. In effect, then, a country with positive net exports of the services of a given factor must be relatively abundant in that factor, and a country with negative net exports (i.e., positive net imports) of the services of a given factor must be relatively scarce in that factor.2page 159
As an example of this “factor-content” type of study, Keith Maskus (1985) attempted to ascertain the implied factor endowments in the United States by examining the net exports and net imports of the services of five broad categories of factors of production. For the year 1958, he determined that the factor-abundance rankings were (1) scientists and engineers (most abundant because largest net export), (2) nonproduction workers except scientists and engineers, (3) human capital (reflecting mainly education), (4) production labor, and (5) physical capital (least abundant because largest net import). For 1972, the rankings for the first three factors were the same, but physical capital and production labor switched positions. Along the same line, a very ambitious study of factor abundance and net export of factor services was carried out in 1987 by Harry Bowen, Edward Leamer, and Leo Sveikauskas. This study examined 12 different factors of production in 27 different countries to predict the implied factor abundances (and hence the implied Heckscher-Ohlin trade flows). Their general qualitative results for six countries are given in Table 1. A plus sign indicates that, through trade, the country was a net exporter of the services of that factor and thus was “revealed” to be abundant in that factor (because more of the factor’s services were supplied in production than were demanded by the country through its consumption pattern); a minus sign indicates that the country was a net importer of a factor service and therefore that the country was relatively scarce in that factor (because more of the services of the factor were demanded through the country’s consumption pattern than were supplied in domestic production). For the United States in 1967 (the test year), the Leontief paradox did not seem to exist when allowance was made for factors other than capital and labor. The United States exported the services of capital (as general intuition would expect), as well as the services of professional/technical workers, agricultural workers, and arable land. Eight other services were imported and thus scarce in the United States. With respect to other countries, Table 1 indicates that Canada exported the services of capital, agricultural workers, and various kinds of land while importing different kinds of labor services. Germany and Japan imported capital and land services while exporting the services of professional/technical workers and managerial workers. (The latter two worker categories had the largest page 160net exports for Germany and Japan in the underlying data for Table 1.) For the developing countries in the table, Mexico was a net exporter of land-based factor services and various labor services while a net importer of the services of capital (these results are not surprising and thus are not paradoxical), while the Philippines imported capital and skilled-labor services and exported some “lower-skilled” labor services (again, results that are not surprising). A relatively recent addition to the list of factors that may serve as a source of comparative advantage is the financial sector. Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005) propose that underlying technological and organizational differences among industries cause them to differ in their need for external financing. If the assumption is made that the services provided by the financial sector are relatively immobile across national boundaries, patterns of industrial specialization should be influenced by the relative endowments of financial development. Using a broad group of developed countries for their empirical analysis, Svaleryd and Vlachos find that countries with well-functioning financial systems tend to specialize in industries highly dependent on external financing. In fact, their results show that differences in financial systems are more important than differences in human capital. Their results support the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model. In a more recent study of comparative advantage in Brazil based on the H-O model, Muriel and Terra (2009) estimated the sources of comparative advantage revealed by its international trade. Two time periods were used in the analysis, the first (1980–1985) just prior to trade liberalization and the second (1990–1995) following trade liberalization. The authors employed estimates of both the relative factor intensities associated with net exports, as well as direct estimates of the factor content of international trade. The results led to the conclusion that Brazilian trade revealed comparative advantages in the use of unskilled labor, capital, and land, but not in goods relatively intensive in skilled labor. Given the actual relative abundance of especially unskilled labor and land, these results tend to support the basic H-O model. However, even the seemingly more friendly results for the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem (such as the Bowen-Leamer-Sveikauskas type) have been called into question. Remember the nature of factor-content tests—they are calculating whether a factor’s services, on balance, are being exported or imported by a country, and, if exported (imported), the conclusion is drawn that the country is abundant (scarce) in that factor. Then a judgment is rendered as to whether this abundance or scarcity fits with general intuition and thus whether H-O generally seems to have been validated. But a point of attack with respect to these more recent studies is that the calculated relative abundance (scarcity) of a factor may not match the actual relative abundance (scarcity) that can be ascertained by the use of different, independent data. In other words, for example, a factor might be calculated as being “relatively abundant” in a country because there is positive net export of the factor’s services, but independent data on actual endowments of the factor in that country and other countries would show the factor to be relatively scarce in that country. The independent data in these comparisons would consist of measures such as a country’s share of the world’s actual endowments of capital and labor (such as used in the Gourdon study discussed on pages 157–58). Indeed, Maskus (1985) found that, in tests comparing the United States with other countries, the actual U.S. relative abundances and scarcities matched the predicted abundances and scarcities two-thirds of the time in one test, one-third of the time in another test, and only one-sixth of the time in a third test. These results are hardly reassuring. Bowen, Leamer, and Sveikauskas also examined their 12 factors in 27 countries to see if the predicted relative abundances and scarcities matched the actual data. Only in 4 of the 12 factors was there a predictive success rate of 70 percent or more across the countries, and only 7 of the 12 factors were successfully predicted for the United States.page 161
In other work, Daniel Trefler (1995) examined, for the year 1983, data for 33 countries that accounted, at the time, for 76 percent of world exports and 79 percent of world GNP. Nine factors of production were considered: (1) capital; (2) cropland; (3) pasture land; (4) professional and technical workers; (5) clerical workers; (6) sales workers; (7) service workers; (8) agricultural workers; and (9) production, transport, and unskilled workers. His first test of the data with respect to whether net factor flows through trade matched the expectation from actual endowments produced disappointing results. However, he noted that, while the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem and the usual H-O tests assume that technology/productivity in any given industry is identical across countries, this assumption is very unrealistic. In fact, he found that, across countries, there tended to be systematic differences in productivity levels. For example, Panama’s industries tended to be about 28 percent as productive as U.S. industries, and Finland’s about 65 percent as productive as U.S. industries. Thus the United States had close to four times as much “effective” labor (1/0.28 = 3.6) in comparison with Panama as standard labor force measures would indicate [or, alternatively, Panama had only about one-quarter (0.28) as much “effective” labor relative to the United States as standard labor force measures would indicate]. Hence, Trefler adjusted his data to reflect these differences. Panama’s factor endowments, when compared with those of the United States, were thus only 28 percent of the actual level, Finland’s only 65 percent of the actual level, and so on. These adjusted factor endowments were then used in the comparison of factor endowments with the flows of factor services through trade. This type of adjustment was also accompanied by another adjustment—Trefler felt that, for whatever reason, consumers in any given country had a preference for home goods over foreign goods, and this preference needed to be incorporated into the examination of trade flows. (This adjustment was necessitated in Trefler’s view because standard Heckscher-Ohlin tests seemed to predict a much larger volume of trade than actually occurred—Trefler’s “home bias” was designed to account for this difference.) With both of these adjustments in place, Trefler more satisfactorily “explained” the existing trade patterns than he had done without the adjustments and than had been done with regard to explaining trade in the various previous studies. The thrust of his work, then, is that actual trade differs from Heckscher-Ohlin-predicted trade because technology/productivity levels differ across countries and because consumers have a general preference for home goods. These two factors should be taken account of in considering the determination of trade flows, because H-O by itself does not do a very good job of explaining the flows. In 2002, Conway confirmed Trefler’s conclusion regarding these mysteries but suggested alternate explanations. Further, Feenstra and Hanson (2003) indicate that it is standard in Heckscher-Ohlin models to assume that exports are produced entirely by combining domestic factors of production with domestically produced intermediate inputs. They suggested that in a globalized world this assumption is wrong and that accounting for trade in intermediate inputs can help resolve the mystery of the missing trade. In a survey of the relevant literature, Helpman (1999) strongly questioned the home-bias assumption of Trefler. However, Helpman and others have increasingly explored the notion of productivity/technology differences across countries, and the view that such differences are important is becoming more generally accepted. Helpman (1999, p. 133) noted that recent work suggests that “allowing for differences in techniques of production can dramatically improve the fit of factor content equations. Now economists need to identify the forces that induce countries to choose different techniques of production.” Further, Reeve (1998, cited in Helpman, 1999) and Davis, Weinstein, Bradford, and Shimpo (1997) have found, in different settings, that factor endowments do a decent job of predicting the location of particular types of industries, if not of predicting trade itself. That is, while a country that is relatively abundant in a particular factor may not have been found by page 162existing estimation techniques to be exporting the services of that factor, the country’s production structure emphasizes goods that are relatively intensive in that factor. This finding would be consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin general notion that a country will specialize in the production of goods utilizing the country’s abundant factors, even if the next step of linking production to trade has not been empirically established.
In another study of the issue of productivity/technology differences across countries, Schott (2003) looked beyond the traditional industry-based data to examine the actual subsets of goods produced in a country. His contention was that too many traditional attempts to find empirical support for the Heckscher-Ohlin idea that a country’s endowments determine production and trade have used the overly restrictive assumption that all countries produce a given category of goods using the same technology. Schott argued that within the category of electronics, for example, the more labor-abundant Philippines may be producing portable radios while the more capital-abundant Japan is manufacturing semiconductors and satellites. The Schott approach permits a given sector’s output to vary with a country’s endowments, allowing countries to move in and out of sectors as they develop. The estimation focuses on finding the capital per labor cutoffs, where changes in the subset of output produced take place and using this to group countries according to the subset of goods they produce. Schott’s technique highlights the potential differences in the choices of output within industries across countries and suggests that moving beyond the standard, industry-level data is necessary to test Heckscher-Ohlin hypotheses. By designating products within the category of manufacturing by the relative capital intensity of their production, Schott found strong support for the idea that country product mix varies with relative endowments. In addition to pointing out the need to move beyond industry-level data to test international specialization, this analysis suggests that the technique can be used to explore violations of Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions assigned to home bias in trade (e.g., Trefler, 1995). A newer approach to empirical verification of the Heckscher-Ohlin hypothesis suggests that the quality of available data has been a problem in the testing process. Fisher and Marshall (2007) found overwhelming support for the Heckscher-Ohlin paradigm using Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) input-output data on the technology of production across 33 countries in the year 2000. Fisher and Marshall used this rich data set to create a technology matrix for each country. By observing a specific output vector for a country, they defined the country’s “virtual endowment” as the factor services that would be needed to produce that output in view of the implied level of technology of the country. While their innovative empirical approach is new, their results suggested that a more careful treatment of technological differences between countries can explain a substantial portion of Trefler’s missing trade. Fisher and Marshall hope that the availability of new and better data will allow economists to reexamine past studies that questioned the validity of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem using differences in technology and restore the profession’s confidence in this important paradigm. Finally, some new work has attempted to test the relative strength of the Heckscher-Ohlin analysis and other approaches in explaining actual trade patterns. For a summary of this work, see the “In the Real World” box on pages 163–64. In overview, while the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem is logical, straightforward, and seemingly a commonsense hypothesis, there have been difficulties in demonstrating the validity of the theorem in practice. As empirical work continues, however, we are beginning to get a better picture of what the analysis does and does not seem to explain. Supplementary forces besides factor endowments and factor intensities increasingly need to be considered, however, and some of these factors are dealt with in the next chapter.page 163 This chapter began with Leamer and Levinsohn’s call for a reorientation of empirical work in international trade. Their call was summarized in the statement “Estimate, don’t test.” In other words, draw on relevant empirical evidence to improve understanding of a phenomenon rather than trying to devise a perfect, yes-or-no test of a theorem explaining the phenomenon. A review of empirical work on the H-O-V model by Davis and Weinstein (1996) suggested that the accumulation of results is more influential than any individual study. Each study sheds new light on the circumstances under which a particular theory is useful. Davis and Weinstein suggested that researchers should both estimate and test. Their suggested criterion: Does the test narrow the range of sensible application of the theory? An affirmative reply indicates that the test is useful.
Two 2010 articles in the international economics literature focused on examining the contribution of a Heckscher-Ohlin explanation of country specialization compared to other explanations of the pattern of any given country’s trade. These recent additions to the long stream of Heckscher-Ohlin tests indeed suggest that the H-O model is relevant to the real world, but they also point out that the H-O analysis does not produce the sole explanation of the structure of trade and specialization. David Chor (2010) of Singapore Management University, in seeking to identify the underlying sources of comparative advantages of countries, looked at the patterns of specialization in bilateral trade of any given country with its various trading partners. The dependent variable in his regressions was the value of exports of a country to a specific trading partner in a specific industry. He employed a sample of 83 countries (and thus each country had 82 potential trading partners) and 20 manufacturing industries for the year 1990. Not all partners engaged in trade in all the industries, but Chor still ended up with over 45,000 data points. For explanatory variables (independent variables) of the amount of bilateral trade, he utilized distance and geographic variables (such as whether there was a common border, a common language, and so on), the Heckscher-Ohlin variables of human capital per worker and physical capital per worker, and institutional variables representing the level of a country’s financial development, the country’s dependence on external sources of finance (foreign investment or borrowing), the flexibility in a country’s labor market, and various aspects of the country’s legal system. Important results that Chor obtained were that, predictably, distance was significant—other things being equal, a halving of distance between partners led to more than a doubling of their bilateral trade. Pertaining directly to the focus of this chapter, there was verification of the importance of Heckscher-Ohlin, in that relatively skilled-labor-abundant countries had greater exports in the more skilled-labor-intensive industries. Also, if a country had a relatively greater endowment of physical capital per worker, it tended to have greater exports in physical-capital-intensive industries, other things being equal. For the institutional variables, one result was that countries with higher levels of financial development were more successful in exporting goods from industries that had greater amounts of external funding. Of further interest, Chor also attempted to focus on welfare and found that, as a general rule, if the human capital variables’ separate influences on specialization were taken away, country welfare on average would fall by 3.1 percent; for physical capital by itself, the fall in welfare would be 2.8 percent. These welfare declines were larger than would occur, for example, with the institutional variables of the country’s financial development and its labor market flexibility. Peter Morrow (2010) of the University of Toronto studied the role of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem in explaining trade patterns in a somewhat different manner. He noted that, in theory, the Ricardian model (of Chapters 2–4 in this text) indicates that countries export goods from industries that have the greatest relative productivity (or, in modern terminology, the greatest relative total factor productivity [TFP]) compared to trading partners. The Heckscher-Ohlin analysis, on the other hand, ignores productivity differences across countries by assuming that the production function in any given industry is the same everywhere; the analysis then attributes comparative advantage to relative factor endowments and relative factor intensities. In the real world, page 164though, suppose that an exporting industry indeed uses the relatively abundant factor in a relatively intensive way in the production process but that the factor is also relatively more productive compared to the trading partner countries—in this mixed kind of setting, do you consider comparative advantage to be a result of the Heckscher-Ohlin model or of the Ricardian model? To get at this question of the relative importance of the Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin models, Morrow empirically tested trade patterns and their causes with a sample of 20 countries (both developed countries and developing countries), 24 manufacturing industries, and 11 years (1985–1995). The formulation of his theoretical model and of his precise empirical tests is beyond the scope of this text, but the essence is that the variability of the relationship between productivity (TFP) and skill intensity across industries was decomposed into the variation due to relative factor abundance and the variation due to Ricardian-type international relative productivity differences. Important Morrow results were that countries with a relative abundance of skilled labor specialized in the production of skilled-labor-intensive goods and that relative productivity in any given industry was uncorrelated with the relative skill intensity employed in that industry. In other words, although relative productivity in an industry is certainly, in and of itself, a source of comparative advantage, that result is not being intermingled with Heckscher-Ohlin relative skill intensity when empirical tests are run. Therefore, separation of the Ricardian model from the Heckscher-Ohlin model is possible, and Morrow concluded that, empirically, both the Ricardian and the Heckscher-Ohlin models are useful in explaining specialization patterns of countries. Finally, the H-O explanation of comparative advantage was somewhat more important than the Ricardian explanation, in that a given variation (one standard deviation) in relative factor abundance was judged by Morrow to be 1.6 to 2.3 times as powerful as a variation of one standard deviation in Ricardian TFP in explaining patterns of production in a country. Sources: David Chor, “Unpacking Sources of Comparative Advantage: A Quantitative Approach,” Journal of International Economics 82, no. 2 (November 2010), pp. 152–67; Peter M. Morrow, “Ricardian-Heckscher-Ohlin Comparative Advantage: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of International Economics 82, no. 2 (November 2010), pp. 137–51.
In recent years, a debate has been taking place in the United States and in western Europe over a phenomenon that is associated with the Heckscher-Ohlin analysis. While the debate is not always couched in H-O terms (the average person on the street, unlike you, is not an expert on Heckscher-Ohlin!), it involves an important implication of that analysis and has also been the subject of empirical tests. The phenomenon is the growing income inequality that has been occurring in the developed countries.3 It is clear that income inequality in the United States has been increasing in recent years. For example, U.S. Census Bureau4 data indicate that the share of household income (in constant 2013 dollars) received by the lowest 20 percent of households fell from a high of 4.3 percent in 1976 to 3.2 percent in 2013, while the top 20 percent of households experienced an increase in their share of income from 43.7 percent in 1976 to 51.0 percent in 2013. During the same period, the middle 20 percent (40–60) of households experienced a drop from 17.0 percent of income to 14.4 percent, while the second quintile page 165(20–40) faced a decline from 10.3 percent to 8.4 percent and the share of the fourth quintile (60–80) dropped from 24.7 percent to 23.2 percent. With respect to average real household income by household in dollar terms from 1976 to 1913, the changes were as follows: lowest 20 percent—minus 0.7 percent; second lowest 20 percent—plus 6.2 percent; middle 20 percent—plus 10.7 percent; second highest 20 percent—plus 21.7 percent; and top 20 percent—plus 52.5 percent. (Above that level, the Census Bureau also gives the change for the top 5 percent of households—plus 74.2 percent.) Thus, over this long period, the second lowest quintile’s income grew faster than the first’s, the third’s faster than the second’s, and similarly on up the scale. There has been a general widening of the income distribution; it is not correct, looking at these particular data, to say that it’s only the very top income earners who have gained at the expense of everyone else; the only group that lost was the lowest group, but the distribution widened all the way up the scale. This same general broad widening of the entire income distribution also occurs if we look at the Census Bureau real household income data pertaining to the “Great Recession” of recent years and the beginnings of recovery. In those years, all quintiles experienced a decrease in household income, but the decreases were smaller as one goes up the income scale. The changes from 2007 to 2013 were as follows: lowest 20 percent of households—decrease of 10.2 percent; second lowest 20 percent—decrease of 7.8 percent; middle 20 percent—decrease of 6.8 percent; second highest 20 percent—decrease of 6.0 percent; highest 20 percent—decrease of 1.9 percent; and top 5 percent—decrease of 0.1 percent.
It should be noted, however, that measurements of the amount of growth in income inequality in the United States over the last several decades depend to a considerable degree on the estimates/measurements of income. The above Census Bureau measures of income include money income received by households—including income from work, interest, dividends, and cash transfer payments of various kinds such as unemployment compensation and welfare payments (although not non-cash transfers such as food stamps), but not capital gains. Another set of data by other researchers, for example, concentrates on the top 1 percent of income earners in the United States, and measures income before deduction for income taxes and prior to any transfer payments and including capital gains, and finds that the percentage of income received by the top 1 percent rose from 9 percent in 1976 to 20 percent in 2011.5 This result seems hard to reconcile with the Census Bureau figures that had the top 5 percent earning 22.2 percent in 2013 (and 22.3 percent in 2011). The treatment of taxes, transfers, and capital gains obviously makes a difference. Nevertheless, by any measure, and many studies have been conducted, there has been a clear rise in the degree of income inequality in the United States during the past several decades. Finally, figures pertaining to wealth (i.e., the net worth of households = the value of all assets minus the value of all liabilities) rather than income show increased inequality as well. For example, the Pew Research Center in 2011 indicated that in 2009 the median net worth of the typical household headed by an older individual (65 years and older) was $170,494, while the median net worth of a household headed by a younger individual (under 35 years) was $3,662. Although the older household would clearly be expected to have greater net worth because of a lifetime of accumulation and earnings, the 2009 ratio of 47 to 1 ($170,494 ÷ $3,662 = 47) of the two typical households had been a ratio of 10 to 1 in 1984. To put this difference in clearer perspective, the net worth of the median older household had risen (in real terms) by 42 percent since 1984, while the net worth of the median younger household had decreased by 68 percent from the 1984 level.6page 166 Taking a longer view, Wojciech Kopczuk suggested that there are four different ways of measuring wealth distribution in the United States and the share held by top groups—by carrying out a sample survey weighted toward wealthy individuals, by looking at estate tax records, by estimating wealth from the flow of capital income of individuals, and by examining lists of the wealthiest individuals such as provided by Forbes magazine.7 Kopczuk is able to assemble data over the long haul on capital income (1913–2012) and the estate tax (1916–2000). He concludes from this long-run information that the share of U.S. wealth held by the top 10 percent of individuals has fluctuated between 65 and 85 percent of total wealth, the share of the top 1 percent between 20 and 45 percent, and the share of the top 0.1 percent from a little below 10 percent to 25 percent. Importantly, after 1980, one series (estimating wealth from capital income) showed a dramatic increase for these top groups through 2012 while the other series (estimating wealth from estate tax collections) stayed relatively constant through 2000. Note, though, that because of estate tax changes and increases in the size of estate needed in order to be required to pay federal estate tax, that series was not really able to be calculated usefully after 2000. On the basis of this work and on other studies, however, it is fair to say that wealth as well as income inequality has increased in recent decades in the United States.8 Meanwhile, in western Europe, where wage rates are less flexible than in the United States due to institutional factors such as strong labor legislation and prominent unions, the increased inequality has registered itself not so much through widening wage differentials as through increased unemployment rates (with consequent loss of income). In 1973, the unemployment rate for developed countries in Europe was 2.9 percent, but unemployment averaged 9.3 percent from 1983 to 1991 (Freeman, 1995, p. 18) and in mid-1999 was at double-digit levels in Belgium (12.7 percent), France (14.2 percent), Germany (10.5 percent), Italy (12.0 percent), and Spain (16.1 percent) (The Economist, September 11, 1999, p. 114). For the same five countries, the mid-2015 figures were 8.6 percent, 10.3 percent, 6.4 percent, 12.4 percent, and 22.5 percent, respectively (The Economist, July 11, 2015, p. 80). This phenomenon of rising inequality clearly has generated considerable tension and dissatisfaction. It was an important factor in the emergence of the Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States in 2011, although other matters lay behind that movement as well. To many observers, a disturbing factor about this rise in inequality is that it has been occurring at the same time that the United States and the world as a whole have been becoming more open to international trade. In 1970, the ratio of U.S. exports to U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) was 5.5 percent, while that of imports to GDP was 5.4 percent; by 1980 these ratios had reached 10.0 percent for exports and 10.6 percent for imports; and in 2014 the figures were 13.5 percent and 16.6 percent, respectively (Economic Report of the President, February 1999, pp. 326–27; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, October 2015, Table 1.1.5). And, in particular, rapid growth has been occurring in imports into the United States and western Europe from developing countries. These imports into the United States were 14 percent page 167 of all imports in 1970 but rose to 35 percent by 1990, 49 percent in 2000, and 54 percent in 2013. For the European Union countries, the figures were 5 percent of all imports in 1970, 18 percent in 1990, 24 percent in 2000, and 29 percent in 2013.9 These kinds of increases in trade in general and especially in imports from developing countries suggest that there may be a link between them and the rising inequality. Clearly, the Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson theorems can provide such a link. As was developed in Chapter 8, the H-O theorem postulates that a country will export goods intensive in the country’s relatively abundant factor of production and will import goods intensive in the country’s relatively scarce factor of production. Extending this pattern of trade to income distribution considerations, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem indicates that, with trade, the real return to the abundant factor rises and the real return to the country’s scarce factor falls. In the context of an expanded H-O framework for the United States where labor is divided into relatively skilled labor and relatively unskilled labor, such as the framework utilized in empirical tests discussed earlier in this chapter, the implication is that the real incomes of highly skilled workers (who tend to be in the upper portions of the income distribution) will increase with expanded trade and the real incomes of less skilled workers (who tend to be in the lower portions) will decrease. Probing further into the matter, there is an increasing body of information that supports the idea that increased levels of education have a positive relative effect on workers’ incomes. In the United States, full-time working college graduates aged 25–32 on average annually earn about $17,500 more than peers who have only a high school diploma. The actual amount, of course, depends on the degree pursued and the characteristics of the individual involved.10 Other research carried out by the Organization for Economic Development suggests that, across 25 OECD countries, the net long-term returns to having a tertiary degree instead of an upper secondary degree are greater than $175,000 for men and more than $110,000 for women.11 Other studies showed that greater levels of higher education benefit the public sector as well through higher levels of productivity, tax revenues, and social contributions that exceed public investment costs. Finally, additional work has suggested that the return to higher education in developing countries is greater than in higher-income countries.12 The critical question facing trade economists concerns the extent to which the rising imports are the cause of the increased wage inequality.13 Most studies of the relationship have found trade to be a factor accounting for the increased inequality but not a major page 168factor. For example, Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1992, discussed in Burtless, 1995, p. 808) calculated that from 8 to 15 percent of the 1980–1988 rise in the wage differential between college and high school graduates in the United States was attributable to the combined effects of trade and immigration into the United States, with most of this 8 to 15 percent due to the trade component. Other studies also found modest effects, and Richard Freeman (1995, p. 25) summarizes by stating that “factor content analysis studies indicate that trade can account for 10–20 percent of the overall fall in demand for unskilled labor needed to explain rising wage differentials in the United States or rising joblessness in Europe.”
As less developed countries are influenced by the policy prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund and adopt trade strategies that favor export trade, the impact of these policies on the countries needs to be analyzed. A considerable amount of effort has been devoted to examining the link between trade and income inequality at the national level in developed and developing countries. To this point, much less attention has been paid to regional differentiation within the countries. Julie A. Silva (2007) uses Mozambique as a test case for examining the regional differences in inequality. Mozambique is an interesting case because there is a long history of uneven development. The area to the south of the Zambezi River is relatively more developed, while the north is more isolated. The two regions are governed by the same economic development policies but differ in terms of climate, infrastructure, culture, and levels of development. Most of the population lives in rural areas, and 90 percent of rural Mozambicans are involved in agriculture. Households can produce cash (export) crops, domestically traded vegetable crops, or both. Using data from government censuses conducted between 1996 and 2000, cross-sectional analysis was possible. There are significant differences in the trade orientation between the two regions. In the northern districts, 31 percent of agricultural households produce cash (export) crops, while only 13 percent of southern households do. Both regions are similar (18 percent in the north and 13 percent in the south) in terms of growing domestically traded vegetable crops. The primary focus of the analysis is on the impact of the trade variables on income inequality. In the south, Silva’s results suggest that only the domestic trade orientation has a significant impact, and it increases inequality. The coefficient of the export orientation variable is not significant, but this is not surprising because the southern households have a long tradition of resistance to growing cash crops. In addition, the local markets for domestically traded vegetable crops are well developed in the south. The indication that higher levels of trade would increase the income inequality contradicts the standard H-O predictions. In the northern districts, her cross-section analysis suggests that the export orientation has a negative and statistically significant impact on inequality. The domestic trade orientation coefficient was positive (contributing to an increase in inequality as in the south) but was not significant. In both regions, the variables measuring physical and human capital were significant. In addition, the percentage of households that were female-headed was also significant but also curious. In the south, a higher percentage of female-headed households contributed to greater income inequality. In the north, the coefficient on female-headed households was negative and significant. While this result contradicts the expectation that economic marginalization of women in sub-Saharan Africa would lead to higher inequality, the explanation may lie in the matrilineal social system of three of the largest tribes in northern Mozambique. In these tribes, wealth and land tenure pass through the female line. Overall, this study suggests the need to move beyond the traditional H-O framework focusing on the national level as we study income inequality in developing countries. The framework seems to be too narrow to capture the dynamics within and across regions in the less developed countries. The case of Mozambique suggests that differences in history, culture, and capital across regions may be as critical as the economic forces in explaining income inequality. Source: Julie A. Silva, “Trade and Income Inequality in a Less Developed Country: The Case of Mozambique,” Economic Geography 83, no. 2 (April 2007), pp. 111–36. page 169 The findings on this relatively minor role for trade have been disputed by other economists.14 The most ardent advocate of the view that the increased trade with the developing countries has led to the increased income inequality in developed countries has been Adrian Wood of the University of Sussex (see Wood, 1991, 1994), who contends that the usual estimates of the decrease in demand for unskilled labor in the developed countries are significant underestimates. In essence, he claims that replacing labor-intensive imports from developing countries with developed-country production would require considerably more low-skilled labor than is generally thought to be the case. As a response to these arguments, economists have usually made several major points, which we summarize here: A major consideration brought out in the discussion is that if trade is operating in accordance with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem to generate the increased inequality, then the prices of low-skill-intensive goods would also be falling. This follows because factor prices in the Heckscher-Ohlin analysis move in the same direction as the prices of the goods that the factors are used to produce. However, studies of relative goods’ price movements in recent years do not find a pronounced decline in the prices of unskilled-labor-intensive goods relative to skilled-labor-intensive goods. Thus, the trade explanation for the increased inequality lacks a mechanism that is consistent with trade theory. The rise in the demand for skilled labor relative to unskilled labor in the developed countries has not been confined to the traded goods industries—indeed, it has occurred across almost all industries. If the increased inequality were purely a trade phenomenon, the fall in the relative price of unskilled labor would cause the nontraded goods industries to substitute toward the use of relatively more unskilled labor, which is the opposite of what has happened. Rather, the use of skilled labor relative to unskilled labor has risen across industries, whether the industries are producing traded goods or nontraded goods. Consequently, the general rise in demand for skilled labor in all industries is likely to have occurred because of the nature of technological change in this age of increased use of computers, robots, and so on. There are other reasons for the decline in the relative earnings of unskilled labor besides trade and the above-mentioned technological change. In regard to the United States, some such reasons are the increased immigration of relatively unskilled labor, the decline in the importance and influence of organized labor, and the fall in the real minimum wage (since the nominal minimum wage has not kept pace with the price level). Indeed, in an informal survey of economists attending a conference at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the average respondent attributed 45 percent of the rising wage inequality in the United States to technological change, 11 percent to trade, and less than 10 percent each to the decline in the real minimum wage, the decline in unionization, and the increased immigration of unskilled labor (with the remainder attributed to various other reasons). (See Burtless, 1995, p. 815, and Economic Report of the President, February 1997, p. 175.) Despite these strong points, however, the matter of the causes of the inequality is an unsettled one. For example, Wood has countered the technological-change argument by page 170strongly suggesting that the adoption of the unskilled-labor-saving type of new technology is occurring as a response to the threat of imports and thus that this reduction in the demand for unskilled labor should also be attributed to trade.15 Further, it could be said that the weakening of unions is also a result of new trade pressures. In addition, other potential causes for the increased inequality have been suggested. For example, Robert Feenstra and Gordon Hanson (1996) hypothesized that an important factor in reducing the demand for unskilled labor is the rise in “outsourcing” by U.S. firms. The point here is that firms are increasingly shipping abroad their component and intermediate-input production that is relatively unskilled-labor-intensive in nature, and this can also put downward pressure on the wages of U.S. low-skilled laborers. In Feenstra’s view (1998, p. 41), outsourcing and the shifting of activities abroad lead to the result that “the whole distinction between ‘trade’ versus ‘technology’ becomes suspect.” This muddling of trade and technology occurs because outsourcing can importantly be a response to technological change (e.g., improvements in communications, enhanced use of computers for inventory and monitoring purposes), and then trade responds to the outsourcing. Hence, in this view, the most important cause of increasing inequality is not to be identified as trade or technology—rather, both trade and technology are involved together in the increasing-wage-inequality process. To conclude this discussion, it is difficult in empirical analysis to sort out the specific impact on inequality of trade by itself in a complex, dynamic economy undergoing continuous structural change. Economists in general tend to doubt that trade is the dominant factor in the rising wage inequality, but needed work continues on this important issue.
Robert Feenstra and Gordon Hanson (1996) maintained that outsourcing has played an important causal role in the increasing wage inequality that has occurred in the United States in recent decades. To test this hypothesis, they constructed a measure of outsourcing and a measure of the trend in wage inequality for the years 1972–1990 for 435 U.S. industries and ran statistical tests to see if there was a significant association between the two constructed data series. Feenstra and Hanson measured outsourcing for an industry as the share of imported intermediate inputs in the purchases of total nonenergy materials by the industry. Hence, if $30 worth of inputs were imported and the industry’s total nonenergy input purchases were $1,000, outsourcing would be calculated for this industry as 0.03 (=$30/$1,000). Energy inputs generally cannot be outsourced since the geographical location of such supplies cannot be shifted, but this measure in effect treats all other imported inputs as fitting into the “outsourced” category. This is a very broad measure of outsourcing. To some observers, outsourcing (often called “offshoring”) intuitively implies something more narrow, as in Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi (1998, p. 82), who defined it as “the relocation of one or more stages of the production of a good from the home country”; or, as in current discussions in the United States, the sending of particular jobs abroad, such page 171as staffing call centers in India rather than in the United States (for more discussion of outsourcing, see Chapter 16). In contrast, the Feenstra-Hanson measure counts goods that have nothing to do with relocated production from a home firm. Nevertheless, using their measure (which they called SO), Feenstra and Hanson indicated increasing interdependence between the United States and other countries, since SO for the 435 industries in the aggregate doubled from 1972 (5.34 percent) to 1990 (11.61 percent). Feenstra and Hanson also examined another measure of interdependence (which they called SM), which was the share of imports in final U.S. consumption of the products of the various industries. This figure for the 435 industries as a whole also doubled from 1972 (5.02 percent) to 1990 (10.65 percent). Feenstra and Hanson (1996, p. 242) took the fact that SO and SM moved together over the period as “consistent with the idea that outsourcing is a response to import competition.” In other words, when final goods imports as a percentage of U.S. consumption rose, U.S. firms responded by seeking lower costs through obtaining intermediate inputs from foreign locations. As a measure of wage trends, Feenstra and Hanson calculated, for each of the 435 industries, the share of the industry’s wage bill that is paid to nonproduction workers. This is used as a proxy for the relative demand for skilled labor. As payments to nonproduction workers (e.g., executives, scientists, computer technicians) rise relative to payments to production workers, this measure (which they called SN) will rise. This rise is interpreted by Feenstra and Hanson to be a relative increase in the demand for skilled labor and hence an indication of greater wage inequality. Again, this measure is clearly a broad one, and it ignores differing skills and wage trends within the nonproduction-worker category, as well as within the production-worker category. With the SO, SM, and SN figures in hand for the 435 industries, Feenstra and Hanson then conducted statistical tests for the years 1972–1990. They divided the period into two parts (1972–1979 and 1979–1990), in recognition of the fact that the increasing-inequality phenomenon had basically begun only at about the end of the 1970s. Their results were that, for 1972–1979, the annual changes in SN were not related to the annual changes in SO (after allowing for other influences on the wage share besides the annual changes in SO); for 1979–1990, however, there was a highly significant positive association between SN and SO. Changes in SN were also positively related to changes in SM in a highly significant manner in the later period, whereas that had not been the case in the earlier period. In view of these statistical associations and the differing results for the later period as compared with the earlier period, Feenstra and Hanson (1996, p. 243) concluded that their research suggests, for the 1979–1990 period, “that outsourcing has contributed substantially to the increase in the relative demand for nonproduction labor.” Indeed, they estimated that the outsourcing could account for from 30.9 to 51.3 percent of the increase that had occurred in the share of the wage bill going to nonproduction workers. In a followup study, Feenstra and Hanson (2003) presented evidence of a direct link between trade and wage inequality. By using data on changes in industry behavior over time, they showed that foreign outsourcing or offshoring is associated with increases in the share of wages paid to skilled workers in the United States, Japan, Hong Kong, and Mexico. In several cases, outsourcing can account for half or more of the observed skill upgrading. In the case of the United States, Feenstra and Hanson present evidence that during the 1980s and 1990s outsourcing contributed to changes in industry productivity and product prices that, in turn, mandated increases in the relative wage of skilled labor. Building upon the Feenstra-Hanson work, David Hummels, Rasmus Jorgensen, Jakob Munch, and Chong Xiang (2014) examined the effects of offshoring by firms in Denmark on Danish workers’ wages. They note that the purchase of an input from a foreign supplier can clearly replace work previously done by a domestic laborer, hence potentially costing the domestic worker a job or resulting in a lower wage. On the other hand, the domestic firm, by buying cheaper inputs from abroad, can reduce the firm’s costs, increase the firm’s productivity, and perhaps thus lead to increased domestic output and employment and to a higher domestic wage. Hummels, Jorgensen, Munch, and Xiang investigated this research question by looking at the period 1995–2006 and at the individual firm, product, and worker level. A central conclusion was that offshoring increased the wages of Danish skilled labor and lowered the wages of Danish unskilled labor. Interesting other conclusions were that workers doing routine jobs lost wages, while workers in occupations that utilized knowledge in math, social science, and languages gained. Natural science and engineering workers were neither more nor less likely to be protected from the effects of offshoring on wages than was an average manufacturing worker. page 172
The seemingly straightforward and intuitively appealing Heckscher-Ohlin theorem has been subjected to a large number of empirical tests. However, the theorem has not had a particularly high success rate. An early and extensive test for the United States resulted in the famous Leontief paradox. Various explanations for the occurrence of this paradox have been offered, but none of them has been judged to be entirely convincing. The most promising avenues for further testing of Heckscher-Ohlin seem to lie in the incorporation of a larger number of factors of production by disaggregating labor into different skill categories and by adding natural resources, as well as incorporation of technology differences across countries. Nevertheless, tests for other countries besides the United States have sometimes shown success in the standard two-factor framework. In addition, tests of a significant implication of the Heckscher-Ohlin analysis—that a country’s scarce factor loses from trade—have been conducted in the context of examining the importance of trade as a cause of rising income inequality (especially in the United States); these tests have also yielded mixed results. Particularly given the frustrations that have emerged with respect to successful verification of the Heckscher-Ohlin predictions on trade patterns, two questions pose themselves to economists: (1) Should we look for better ways of testing Heckscher-Ohlin? or (2) Should we search for other theoretical explanations of trade patterns and the composition of trade, as H-O has not been particularly successful? The literature has moved in both directions in response to these questions. The “better-testing” approach has focused importantly on extending the analysis to a greater number of factors than the original two, capital and labor. This approach runs the risk that, in disaggregating into more factors, we lose generality and meaningful understanding of the forces influencing a country’s trade pattern. As Paul Samuelson has suggested, we may end up concluding that Switzerland exports Swiss watches because Switzerland is well endowed with Swiss watchmakers! The second approach of searching for alternative trade theories to Heckscher-Ohlin has generated a great deal of activity in recent years. These newer theories are the subject of the next chapter.